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* The project would not have been possible without the cooperation of the
lawyers, judges, and human rights advocates who met with us in Guatemala. We
would like to thank all those who took time from their important work to help us in
our research. In particular, we would like to thank the survivors and families of
victims who met with us and shared their personal tragedies.
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ci6n Ciudadana's Executive Director Manfredo Marroquinn and office manager
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making other arrangements. Members of other organizations provided lengthy
briefing sessions that helped our delegation understand the current political situa-
tion, including Paul Seils and Frank LaRue of CALDH, Helen Mack. Alejandro
Sfinchez, and Carmen Aida Ibarra of the Myma Mack Foundation, Victor Ferrigno
of Proyecto Pro-Leyes, and Professor Sergio Fernando Morales of San Carlos Uni-
versity.
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tion, and was an especially good guide for our trip to Rabinal.
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garet Popkin, Executive Director of the Due Process of Law Foundation, partici-
pated in part of the mission, reviewed the draft report, and suggested a number of
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PREFACE
From March 8 to March 20, 2000, a seven-person delegation of
lawyers and law students visited Guatemala to research the progress
of high-profile massacre cases through the Guatemalan legal system.
Throughout the report where mention is made to "the delegation," it
is in reference to this group. Members of the delegation traveled
widely in Guatemala, meeting with government officials, prosecutors
and other attorneys, human rights advocates, and members of the ju-
diciary, the military, Congress, and exhumation teams. The informa-
tion contained in this report is as of March 2000. While some up-
dates have been added since then, the report may not reflect all
recent developments.
Before traveling to Guatemala, the delegation did extensive re-
search into the history of Guatemala, the structure of the Guatemalan
government, the history of the internal armed conflict, the recent re-
forms in the justice system, the international obligations of Guate-
mala and other relevant topics. The team used sources from Guate-
mala and the international community. Of particular help were
Guatemala: Never Again!, the report of the Recovery of Historical
Memory Project ("REMHI"), by the Archdiocese of Guatemala, and
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, the report of the Historical Clarifi-
cation Commission ("CEH"), a U.N.-sponsored truth commission.
While not universally accepted, especially by parts of the military
and the business sector, the REMHI and CEH reports are widely ac-
knowledged as authoritative sources of information on the atrocities
committed during the internal armed conflict.
Although REMHI documented over 400 massacres, the delegation
focused on four specific massacres: Rio Negro, Plan de Sdinchez, Dos
Erres, and Cuarto Pueblo. The delegation chose these cases because
they were representative as to the actors involved, the scope of al-
leged atrocities, and the actions or lack thereof taken to resolve them
following the end of the internal armed conflict. They also provide
examples of cases in different stages of the judicial process, and of
1118 [16:1115
IfPUNITY LV Gu ,4 TEMAL-I111
problems that judicial actors encountered at each stage of the investi-
gation and prosecution of the massacre cases. The report also draws,
where appropriate, on other cases that highlight particular problems.
Through analysis of these cases, and wide-ranging interviews in
Guatemala, the delegation was able to identify a broad range of
problems that exist in the judicial system. This report focuses on
these problems and the ways they contribute to the substantial delays
in prosecuting those responsible for the atrocities of the internal
armed conflict, and offers recommendations for overcoming those
obstacles.
While in Guatemala, the delegation conducted over fifty inter-
views in Guatemala City and in the towns of Salama, Rabinal, Co-
bdn, Flores, and San Benito with local prosecutors, judges, human
rights advocates, survivors and relatives of victims of the massacres,
and witnesses to the massacres. The interviewees were chosen based
on their knowledge of relevant aspects of massacre cases, or their
knowledge of the justice system or the government as it relates to the
prosecution of massacre cases. These interviews served as a major
source for this report.
The delegation recognizes that there have been significant reforms
in the Guatemalan justice system since the end of the internal armed
conflict. It is the hope of the delegation that this report will be of use
in addressing the problems that continue to exist despite these re-
forms.
T7ze helicopter came and flew over Cuarto Pueblo. At first, the people
were frightened and left, but then the helicopter flew olf and the people
cane back to the market. The' didn't realize that the soldiers were ap-
proaching and surrounding the people. They had then congregated there
for about tvo days. And the soldiers put iwires red. red hot from the fire
into them, stuck into their mouths and all the way down into their stom-
achs. The)' kicked others, not caring if it was a little child or a woman, or
if she was pregnant. They didn't spare anyone there. - Case 920, Cuarto
Pueblo, Ixcn, Quiche, 1982.
1. RECOVERY OF HISTORICAL MEMORY PROJECT ("REMHI"), GUATEMALA:
NEVER AGAIN!, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE,
ARCHDIOCESE OF GUATEMALA ("ODHA") 137 (1999) [hereinafter REMH1
REPORT].
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INTRODUCTION
During Guatemala's thirty-six year internal armed conflict, the
Guatemalan military reportedly committed the vast majority of the
422 documented massacres, including that of Cuarto Pueblo where
the military allegedly slaughtered over three hundred people as part
of a counterinsurgency operation in 1982.2 Under international and
domestic law, Guatemala has a duty to investigate and a duty to pro-
vide an effective remedy for victims of the massacres by prosecuting
the perpetrators of the massacres and providing reparations to the
victims The State has failed to fulfill this duty to provide timely
justice. In only one massacre out of these 422 documented massa-
cres, the Rio Negro massacre, has anyone been tried and convicted.
Those convicted, sixteen years after the events occurred, were low-
level participants in the massacre and neither planned nor ordered the
• • 4
killings.
This report examines the Guatemalan State's failure to fulfill its
legal duty to investigate and provide an effective remedy for viola-
tions of the right to life in the massacre cases.' Beyond documenting
2. See id. at 134, 137 (observing that a majority of the massacres occurred in
1981-1982). The conflict began in 1960 and ended in 1996 with the signing of the
Peace Accords. The REHMI report identified 422 massacres that occurred during
the conflict, and concluded that the Army or state-backed paramilitary forces
committed 90.52 percent of those massacres while the guerrillas committed the
remaining 9.48 percent. The REHMI Report, however, does not purport to be an
exhaustive chronicle of the massacres and suggests that more massacres may have
occurred. See id. at 134 (defining massacres as "collective murders associated with
community destruction"); see also Interview with Paul Seils, International Legal
Director, Centro Para Accion Legal y Derechos Humanos ("CALDH") [Center for
Legal Action and Human Rights], in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 10, 2000) [hereinafter
Seils Interview] (on file with author).
3. See infra Part II (discussing Guatemala's international and domestic legal
obligations to regarding violations of the right to life).
4. See I U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, GUATEMALA 772 (1999) [hereinafter DOS REPORT] (explaining that
although those convicted were only low-level participants, human rights groups
consider the convictions important legal precedent).
5. Although the perpetrators of the massacres violated a number of human
rights, this report, like the investigative efforts in Guatemala, focuses on the viola-
tion of the right to life. Other violations of human rights that occurred during the
massacres include rape, torture and mass displacement. See generally, REMH!
REPORT, supra note 1. This report does not imply that providing a remedy for vio-
1120 [16:1115
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this failure, the report identifies six specific obstacles that prevent the
State from meeting its international obligations. Those obstacles are
as follows:
1. intimidation of witnesses and officials:
2. corruption of officials;
3. incompetence of officials;
4. inadequate resources and resource management:
5. the lack of a definition of military secrets: and
6. misuse and failure to utilize procedural mechanisms.
The report illustrates these obstacles by using examples from the
four massacre cases of Plan de Sdnchez, Rio Negro, Dos Erres, and
Cuarto Pueblo, as well as several other cases in which State actors
allegedly violated the right to life. Finally, the report offers sugges-
tions for overcoming the obstacles.
The four massacres discussed in this report occurred between 1980
and 1983, the bloodiest period of the internal armed conflict, known
in Guatemala as la violencia.' During la violencia, the Guatemalan
army, under the direction of successive military dictators, carried out
a brutal counterinsurgency policy to fight against the perceived threat
of guerrilla insurgents. The hallmark of the army's counterinsur-
gency program was a "scorched earth" policy, in which the army
burned indigenous Mayan villages and massacred or forcibly moved
their inhabitants.
7
During the Guatemalan peace negotiations and following the end
of the conflict in 1996, quasi-governmental organizations and NGOs
began to investigate the acts of violence committed during the con-
flict. The investigations included exhumations of clandestine mass
graves in small villages around the Guatemalan countryside by fo-
lations of the right to life alone would be sufficient to meet Guatemala's interna-
tional obligations.
6. See REHMI REPORT, supra note 1. at 290 (asserting that they recorded 41,
187 human rights violations between 1980 and 1983 and that nearly eighty percent
of the massacres committed during the internal armed conflict were committed
during those years).
7. See id. at Part Two (discussing the types of violence employed against the
civilian population, the impact of militarization, and the planning that made the
massacres possible).
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rensic anthropologists.! These investigations have produced data sub-
stantiating allegations of widespread violations of the right to life.
The data, compiled in large part by the two truth commissions, the
United Nations-led Commission for Historical Clarification
("CEH"), and the Catholic church-sponsored Recovery of Historical
Memory Project ("REMHI"), indicate that approximately 150,000
people were killed and approximately 50,000 people were "disap-
peared" over the course of the conflict.9
REMHI compiled information on a total of 422 massacres in
which approximately 14,000 victims were murdered.' The REMHI
Report also concluded that the army or state-backed paramilitary
forces committed 90.52 percent of those massacres while the guer-
rillas committed the remaining 9.48 percent." The victims of the
massacres were mostly civilians. 
2
Under both international and domestic law, Guatemala is bound to
investigate these violations of the right to life and provide an effec-
tive remedy by bringing the perpetrators to justice. 3 The State has yet
to initiate prosecutions in the vast majority of these massacre cases.
8. See, e.g., GRAHAME RUSSELL, UNEARTHING THE TRUTH: EXHUMING A
DECADE OF TERROR IN GUATEMALA, (EPICA/CHRLA, May 1996).
9. See Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Report of the Commission on Histori-
cal Clarification, at http://hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/report/english/concl.html (last visited
Apr. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Guatemala: Memory ofSilence]; REMHI REPORT, supra
note 1, at 294 (defining a forced disappearance as "the detention of a person whose
fate is unknown because the detainee either becomes entrapped in a clandestine
detention network or is executed and the body concealed"). See id. (citing the
Truth Commission for El Salvador).
10. See REMHI REPORT, supra note 1, at 134 (explaining that the number of
victims includes the dead and the disappeared).
11. See id. (noting that the total number of massacre victims may be as high as
18,000). The Guatemalan Army has admitted destroying 440 villages. See Steven
E. Hendrix, Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America: Guatemala's
Conversion to the Adversarial System, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 365, 384 (1998)
(citing RICHARD FENsKE, THE SISTER PARISH MOVEMENT: EN LA BUENA LUCHA,
IN THE GOOD STRUGGLE 40 (1996)).
12. See REMHI REPORT, supra note 1, at 133.
13. See infra Part II (discussing Guatemala's legal obligation to provide justice,
as provided in international law, domestic law, peace accords, and the friendly set-
tlement agreement entered into with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights).
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For many years, particularly during the conflict, the State's criminal
justice system was incapable of delivering justice because of a vari-
ety of institutional problems. 4 During the last decade, however, the
Peace Accords, completed in 1996, along with a number of institu-
tional and legislative reforms, have strengthened Guatemala's judi-
cial system.'5 Although the Guatemalan judicial system has made
great strides, at least on paper,'6 the human rights violators responsi-
ble for the massacres continue to enjoy impunity for their actions.
Part I of this report discusses Guatemala's international and do-
mestic legal obligations to investigate violations of the right to life.
Part II briefly describes recent reforms of Guatemala's legal system.
Part III identifies six specific obstacles that prevent the State from
providing timely justice. The Report analyzes each obstacle by using
examples from the Plan de S6nchez, Rio Negro, Dos Erres, and
Cuarto Pueblo massacre cases as well as other high-profile cases.
Part IV summarizes the delegation's recommendations to the State
for overcoming the obstacles and complying with its obligations to
provide justice in the massacre cases. Part V looks at recent devel-
opments in Guatemala and their implications for resolution of the
massacre cases.
I. GUATEMALA'S LEGAL OBLIGATION TO
PROVIDE TIMELY JUSTICE IN THE MASSACRE
CASES
Guatemala is legally obligated to investigate the massacres,
14. See Interview with Lic. Helen Mack, Director, Fundaci6n Myrna Mack,
Member of the Commission on Strengthening the Judiciary, in Guat. City, Guat.
(Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Mack Interview]; Interview with Dr. Eduardo Daniel
Barreda Valenzuela, Justice, Supreme Court of Justice, Civil Section, in Guat.
City, Guat. (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Justice Barreda Interview].
15. See Mack Interview, supra note 14; see also Hendrix, supra note 11, at
410-19 (examining the Guatemalan government's overhaul of its Criminal Proce-
dure Code).
16. See Interview with Frank LaRue, Director, CALDH, in Guat. City, Guat.
(Mar. 11, 2000) [hereinafter LaRue Interview] (on file with author).
17. See American Convention on Human Rights, art. 1(1), O.A.S. Treaty Series
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) (Guatemala acceded
May 25, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention], as interpreted by Velasquez
Rodriquez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C), No. 4, paras. 174-77 (1988),
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prosecute the perpetrators, " and make reparations to the victims'
families' 9 in accordance with multiple legal mechanisms. Guate-
mala's legal obligation to investigate and provide an effective rem-
edy in the massacre cases comes from the international treaties to
which it has acceded, customary international law, and domestic law.
The Peace Accords the State signed with the guerrillas at the end of
the internal armed conflict and the friendly settlement agreements
being negotiated under the auspices of the Organization of American
States ("OAS") may provide additional sources for this legal obliga-
tion. This section reviews these legal obligations as they apply to the
prosecution of the massacre cases.
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. International Treaties
Guatemala is party to treaties that obligate it to investigate viola-
tions of the right to life and to provide effective remedies for those
violations.2" Such treaties include the International Convention on
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b 11_12d.htm (last visited Apr.
4, 2001) (obligating the Guatemalan government to investigate all human rights
violations occurring in its jurisdiction).
18. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(3)(b),
adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) here-
inafter ICCPR] (Guatemala acceded Aug. 5, 1992) (stating that each State Party
should "ensure that any person claiming a remedy shall have his right thereto de-
termined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities").
19. American Convention, supra note 17, art. I(1), as interpreted by Velasquez
Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 17, at paras. 174-77.
20. The governmental institution with responsibility for a specific international
obligation is not individually bound by the treaties. Rather, these obligations are
binding on the State as a whole. Thus, identifying the institution that is not in com-
pliance with the State's international legal obligations in a particular situation is
not legally material to a finding of State responsibility. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1990) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]; SIXTH REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS
MISSION FOR THE VERIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH
THE COMMITMENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN
GLATEMALA ("MINUGUA"), THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
PROCEDURES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM AND LASTING PEACE AND
PROGRESS IN FASHIONING A REGION OF PEACE, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT, § IV, para. 55, at http://www.minugua.guate.net/derhum/sixthrep.
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Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),2' the American Convention on
Human Rights ("American Convention"),' and the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide ("Genocide Conven-
tion"'). 3 Additionally, the case law of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (the "Inter-American Court") binds the Guatemalan
State following the accession of Guatemala to the jurisdiction of the
Court in 1987.24
Article 2(3) of the ICCPR obligates Guatemala to provide victims
of human rights violations with an effective and enforceable remedy
for those violations.2- Guatemala did not become a signatory to the
ICCPR until 1992, so the massacres that occurred in the early 1980's
could not be considered violations of the right to life under Article 6
of the ICCPR. Nevertheless, the massacres constituted violations of
the right to life as articulated in several other documents (including
the American Convention and the Guatemalan Constitution). Guate-
htm (last visited Apr. 4,2001) [hereinafter MINUGUA SIXTH REPORT).
21. See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(3) (obligating Guatemala to investigate
human rights violations and provide remedies for victims of the violations).
22. See American Convention, supra note 17, art. I(1) (requiring Guatemala to
investigate all of the massacres).
23. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, art. 4, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Geno-
cide Convention] (Guatemala acceded Jan. 13, 1950); United Nations Treaty Se-
ries, Genocide Convention, Participants, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/biblei
EnglishlntemetBible/partI/chapterlV/treatyl.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2001).
24. Guatemala acceded to the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction on Mar. 9,
1987. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Prelimina., Objections Before the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights: Legitimate Issues, Illegitimate Tactics, 40 VA. J. IN-'L. L.
1, n.205 (1990) (documenting the effects of Guatemala's accession to the Inter-
American Court's jurisdiction).
25. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(3). This articles provides as follows:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
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malan citizens have had the right to an effective remedy for those
claims under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR since 1992.26 Therefore,
Guatemala's failure to provide an effective remedy in almost all of
the massacre cases is a violation of Article 2(3) of the ICCPR.
Similarly, the American Convention and the case law interpreting
it obligate the State to protect the right to life17 and to prosecute per-
petrators who violate that right.28 Article 25 requires the State to pro-
vide victims of human rights violations "simple and prompt recourse
... to a competent court and an effective remedy for those viola-
tions. ' '29 Article 1(1) obliges States to ensure the free and full exer-
cise of the rights recognized under the American Convention to all
persons in their jurisdiction. In Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras,
the Inter-American Court interpreted Article 1(1) of the American
26. See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(3); see also Vienna Convention, supra
note 20, art. 26 (providing that States are bound to comply with treaties to which
they are a party). Guatemala is not a signatory to the Optional Protocol to the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR Optional
Protocol], which would allow the "[U.N.] Human Rights Committee to receive and
consider... communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations
of any of the rights set forth in the [ICCPR]." See ICCPR Optional Protocol, pre-
amble, adopted Dec. 16, 1966 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) A/RES/2200 A
(XXI).
27. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 4.
28. Id. art. 25.
29. Id. Specifically, Article 25 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effec-
tive recourse, to a competent court of tribunal for protection against acts that
violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution of laws of the
State concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have
been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.
2. The State Parties undertake:
a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights deter-
mined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State;
b. to develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy; and
c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
30. See id. art. 1(1) (declaring, "[t]he State Parties to this Convention undertake
to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms,
without any discrimination .... ).
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Convention to require States to investigate every situation involving
a violation of the rights protected by the Convention.' The Court
further expanded the duty under Article 1(1) to require the State to
"attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as
warranted for damages resulting from the violation.""
Finally, to the extent that the massacres constituted genocide,"
Articles IV and VI of the Genocide Convention subject the Guate-
malan State to certain requirements. Article IV requires the State to
punish perpetrators of genocide, whether those perpetrators are heads
of state, public officials or private individuals." Article VI requires
that competent courts of the State judge those alleged to have com-
mitted acts of genocide.""
2. Customa3 , International Law
In order to supplement the more general language of human rights
31. See Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 17, paras. 174-77 (1988)
(stating, "[t]he State has a legal duty ... to carry out a serious investigation of
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to im-
pose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation"
and "[tihe State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a violation of
the rights protected by the Convention").
32. Id. at paras. 161-67, 176; see also Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C), No. 5, paras. 184-89 (1989), available at http://wwwl.umn.ed.
humanrtsfiachr/b 11_14d.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2001 ).
33. The CEH Report, Guatemala: Memor of Silence, concludes that some
massacres committed by the Army, including those in Rio Negro and Plan de
Sinchez, constituted acts of genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention. See
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, supra note 9, at paras. 108-23. The Report states
that in the massacres where it has identified acts of genocide, the army and para-
military forces aimed to "kill the largest number of [members of a particular Ma-
yan] ... group .... " Id. at para. 113. The Mayan population of Guatemala is
comprised of twenty-three distinct ethnic groups that each speak a different lan-
guage. These groups are divided geographically, so that a massacre in one area
could eliminate much of an ethnic group's population. See id. at Map of Linguistic
Communities of Guatemala. Article II(a) of Genocide Convention defines genocide
as "killing members of the group" "with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national ethnical, racial or religious group." Genocide Convention, supra note 23,
art. II(a).
34. Genocide Convention, supra note 23, art. IV.
35. Id. art. VI.
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treaties, the United Nations 6 has developed a large body of materials
including the U.N. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Inves-
tigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions ("U.N.
Principles"),3" and the U.N. Manual on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions
("U.N. Manual").38 These materials describe methods for combating
impunity and addressing extra-legal, arbitrary, and summary execu-
tions. Although not directly binding on States, these materials are
evidence of customary international law and provide persuasive
authority that supplements the broader treaty terms that bind gov-
ernments."
According to the U.N. Principles and the U.N. Manual, the Gua-
temalan State is responsible for providing thorough, prompt, and im-
partial investigations of the massacre cases by competent investiga-
tors who have adequate authority to conduct effective
investigations.4 ° Prosecutions should follow the investigations of the
perpetrators and should involve the families of the deceased and their
legal counsel. 4' The U.N. Principles prohibit the use of blanket im-
munity and the defense of superior orders, whereby troops blame
36. Guatemala has been a member of the U.N. since November 21, 1945. See
United Nations, List of Member States, at http://www.un.org/overview/unmember.
html (last visited Apr. 3, 2001).
37. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Principles on the
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions, E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, Annex, 1989 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1), U.N.
Doc. E/1989/89 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Principles].
38. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT VIENNA CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS MANUAL ON THE EFFECTIVE
PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATION OF EXTRA-LEGAL, ARBITRARY AND SUMMARY
EXECUTIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/CSDHA/12, U.N. Sales No. 91.IV.1 (1991) [herein-
after U.N. MANUAL].
39. See Shabtai Rosenne, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 19
(1984) (describing United Nations documents as peremptory norms of interna-
tional law).
40. U.N. Principles, supra note 37, paras. 9-17; see also U.N. MANUAL, supra
note 38, at 16 (calling these qualities "[t]he fundamental principles of any viable
investigation into the causes of death").
41. U.N. Principles, supra note 37, paras. 16-18; see also U.N. MANUAL, supra
note 38, at 18-22 (explaining the grief families suffer and the attempt to involve
them in order to minimize the grief).
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their commanding officers for violations.'2 Furthermore, command-
ing officers and other public officials may be held responsible for
their subordinates' violations where there was a reasonable opportu-
nity to prevent those violations.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary and Sum-
mary Executions ("Special Rapporteur on Executions") has stated
that governments have an obligation to conduct exhaustive and im-
partial investigations of alleged violations of the right to life, to
identify and prosecute perpetrators, to compensate victims' families,
and to prevent future violations." Furthermore, governments have the
duty to prosecute not only those who planned and carried out alleged
arbitrary or summary executions, but also those in positions of
authority who failed to prevent them.Y5 Like the United Nations mate-
rials described above, the findings of the Special Rapporteur on Exe-
cutions are evidence of customary international law.
B. DOMESTIC LAW
The State also has a legal obligation to investigate and prosecute
the perpetrators of the massacres under its domestic law. The Gua-
temalan Constitution, in its Preamble, expresses a commitment "to
promote the complete implementation of Human Rights.'" More
42. See U.N. Principles, supra note 37, para. 19 (declaring that blanket immu-
nity shall not be granted under any circumstances, including a state of war, siege,
or other emergency).
43. Id.
44. See Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
in Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other De-
pendent Countries and Territories: Extrajudicial, Summar3y or Arbitrarv Erecu-
tions, Report by the Special Rapporteur, Ar. Bacre WalT Ndiaye, Submitted pur-
suant to Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 1995/73, U.N. Comm'n on Human
Rights, 52nd sess., Agenda Item 10, at paras. 559, 565, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1996'4
(1996) (emphasizing the urgent need to set up an international human rights
mechanism with enough resources to report publicly on the human rights situation
and monitor human rights violations, in addition to assisting with the existing gov-
ernmental obligations).
45. Id.
46. See POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA OF 1985,
preamble (amended 1993), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, Guatemala, Booklet 3 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed. & Reka Koerner trans., 1997)
[hereinafter GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION].
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specifically, other Articles of the Constitution recognize the follow-
ing principles: the State's duty to guarantee justice (Article 2); every
individual's right of free access to tribunals in order to claim his or
her rights under the law (Article 29); the ability to prosecute human
rights violators by filing a complaint (Article 45); adherence to the
rule of law (Article 153); the principle that State officials47 are "sub-
ject to the law and never above it" (Article 154); joint State liability
for the acts of its agents (Article 155); the independence of the judi-
ciary and its capacity to render and execute judgments (Article 203);
and, the primary goal of the Ministerio Pfiblico [Public Ministry], to
oversee "strict fulfillment of the country's laws" (Article 251).
In addition, the Guatemalan criminal procedure code mandates
that human rights protected by the Constitution and international
treaties must be respected in all judicial p. 48treti  mut   dicalproceedings. It also em-
powers the Ministerio Pdiblico to investigate any crime and to prose-
cute anyone guilty of that crime49 and guarantees the continuity of the
prosecution to its end' 0 Further, the penal code has been interpreted
to require the State to provide justice in a timely manner, acknowl-
edging that "tardy justice is the equivalent to a denial of justice."'"
C. PEACE ACCORDS
The Guatemalan Peace Accords between the State and the coali-
tion of the guerrilla organizations, the Unidad Revolucionaria Na-
cional Guatemalteca, were concluded in 1996. Twelve individual
agreements make up the Peace Accords, which were finalized with
the December 29, 1996 signing of the final agreement, the Accord
47. According to the head of a non-governmental organization that interprets
the Guatemalan Constitution, these officials include military personnel. See Inter-
view with Roberto Villeda Arguedas, Director, Centro por la Defensa de la Con-
stituci6n [Center for the Defense of the Constitution], in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar.
16, 2000) [hereinafter Villeda Interview].
48. CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, DECRETO NOMERO 51-92 [CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE, DECREE No. 51-92], art. 16 (Rafil Figueroa Sarti ed. 1998).
49. See id. at arts. 24-25. The C6digo Procesal Penal ("CPP") builds in a modi-
cum of prosecutorial discretion, but it is limited to circumstances other than those
involving serious rights violations. Id. art. 25.
50. Id. art. 19.




for a Firm and Lasting Peace.52 The commitments undertaken by the
State in the Peace Accords have implications for the massacre cases
because they may be evidence of a legal obligation.
For example, Sections III and VIII of the 1994 Comprehensive
Agreement on Human Rights, one of the agreements that make up
the Peace Accords, commit the State to combat impunity and to pro-
vide compensation and assistance to the victims of human rights
violations.53 The Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power
and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society recog-
nizes the importance of overcoming "deficiencies and weaknesses in
civil institutions," including corruption, lack of coordination of the
branches of government, inefficiency in government institutions and
administrative problems within the judiciary. The same agreement
also identifies the need for a judicial process that serves as "an in-
strument for ensuring the basic right to justice.""
President Alfonso Portillo, in his January 2000 inaugural address,
reinforced the commitments expressed in the Peace Accords by an-
52. See MINUGUA, Acuerdos de Paz [Peace Accords], at http:i,www.
minugua.guate.net (last visited Apr. 4, 2001) (listing the various United Nations
documents comprising the Peace Accords).
53. See Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, The Situation in Central
America Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Prog-
ress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy anti Development,
Mar. 29, 1994, at §§ III, VIII, Guat.-Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemal-
teca [Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit] ("URNG"), U.N. Doc. A/48/928-
Sf1994/448 [hereinafter Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights], available
at http://wwv.minugua.guate.net/acuerdosthuman-rights.htn (last visited Apr. 4,
2001). Section III states that "[t]he Parties agree on the need for firm action against
impunity," and Section VIII provides that "[t]he Parties recognize that it is a hu-
manitarian duty to compensate and/or assist victims of human rights violations...
[to] be effected by means of government measures and programmes of a civilian
and socio-economic nature .... Id.; see also Agreement on the Strengthening of
Civilian Power and Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Socie', Sept. 19,
1996, Guat.-URNG, art. 111(9), U.N. Doc. A/51/410-S/1996/853, available at
http://www.minugua.guate.net/acuerdos/StrengtheningCivilianPower.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2001) (asserting that reform should be geared toward preventing the
cover up of impunity and to ensure justice).
54. Agreement on Strengthening Civilian Power, supra note 53, at preamble,
art. 111(8).
55. Id. art. 111(9). This can be manifest by guaranteeing impartiality, objectiv-
ity, universality, and equality under the law. See id.
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nouncing that his Government would assume the implementation of
the Peace Accords as a policy of the State. 6 This action clarifies that
the Peace Accords are an agreement 7 between the State and the guer-
rillas, rather than between only the administration that signed them
and the guerrillas.
D. THE FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
NGOs have brought cases on behalf of victims of massacres and
extra-judicial killings before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights ("IACHR"), alleging violations of the right to life and
requesting a remedy for those violations." In a recent development,
the Guatemalan State entered into friendly settlement negotiations
with plaintiffs in forty-four of the cases brought before the IACHR.59
As part of the negotiations, the State has expressed its intent to sign
an agreement requiring it to fulfill three broad commitments: (1) to
advance truth in the cases, the State must accept and has already ac-
cepted responsibility for violations of the right to life in the forty-
four cases; (2) to achieve justice in those cases, the agreement will
require the State to pursue domestic prosecutions of the perpetrators;
and (3) the State must compensate the families of victims in the mas-
sacre cases and in other, extra-judicial killings. °
56. Discurso de Toma de Posesi6n del Alfonso Portillo, Alfonso Portillo, Guat.
City, Guat., Jan. 14, 2000 [hereinafter Portillo Inaugural Address].
57. The commitments outlined in the peace accords were undertaken by the
parties to the accords, namely the umbrella guerilla group and the State. See The
Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the
Peace Agreements, Dec. 29, 1996, Guat.-URNG, U.N. Doc. A/51/796-S/1997/114,
available at http://www.minugua.guate.net/acuerdos/Implementation.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 200 1).
58. See Telephone Interview with Ronalth Ochaeta, Guatemalan Ambassador
to the Organization of American States (July 8, 2000) [hereinafter Ochaeta Inter-
view] (on file with author).
59. See Andrrs Oppenheimer, Surprise: Praise for Guatemala, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 30, 2000, at 10A (describing actions taken by President Alfonso
Portillo to address human rights violations); see also Statement of the Republic of
Guatemala before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 3, 2000).
60. See Statement of the Republic of Guatemala before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, supra note 59 (outlining the three commitments
agreed to by the State); see also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
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The IACHR will oversee the State's compliance with these com-
mitments." Currently, the State is in the process of negotiating indi-
vidual reparation agreements with the victims or their representatives
in these cases.2 These positive steps, however, do not relieve the
State from its responsibility to pursue domestic criminal prosecutions
in each of the cases. In fact, the State's forthcoming commitment in
the friendly settlement to pursue prosecutions domestically in these
cases only strengthens its preexisting legal obligation to do so. The
individual settlements that may eventually be reached between the
State and each of the forty-four individual plaintiffs would represent
settlements of the petitions before the IACHR. These settlements
would have the finality of a decision of the IACHR. ' The effects of
the State's commitments remain to be seen, however, because the
Executive branch will have made the commitments encompassing
the friendly settlement without the involvement of the Ministerio
Pfibico,6 the prosecutorial arm of the government.
II. RECENT REFORMS OF GUATEMALA'S
JUSTICE SYSTEM
In recent years, Guatemala has reformed procedural aspects of its
criminal justice system by enacting the Codigo Procesal Penal
Organization of American States, Press Release, No. 2/00, para. III.C.9, at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/20OO/Press2-OO.htm (last visited
Apr. 4, 2001) [hereinafter IACHR, Press Release].
61. See IACHR, Press Release, supra note 60, at para. II1.C.8 (noting that the
Commission was pleased that Guatemala was willing to work together to promote
and protect human rights, and to resolve as many cases as possible through friendly
settlement). This process was invoked under Article 48(1 )(f) of the American Con-
vention, which states that the Commission shall help the parties reach a friendly
settlement "on the basis of respect for the human rights recognized in [the] Con-
vention." American Convention, supra note 17, art. 48(1 )(f).
62. See Interview with Lourdes Mylene Woolfolk Contreras and Carlos
Roberto Sandoval Aldana, Lawyers for Comisi6n Presidencial Coordinadora de la
Politica del Ejecutivo en Materia de Derechos Humanos [Presidential Commission
in Charge of the Executive Branch Human Rights Policy] ("COPREDEH"), in
Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 15, 2000) (on file with author). COPREDEH is the gov-
ernmental entity responsible for handling this task. See id.
63. See Ochaeta Interview, supra note 58.
64. See Interview with Victor Hugo God6y, President, COPREDEH, in Guat.
City, Guat. (Mar. 14, 2000) [hereinafter God6y Interview).
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("CPP"), a new criminal procedure code, and by restructuring State
institutions. Congress enacted the CPP in 1994, which converted the
criminal justice system from an inquisitorial to an adversarial sys-
tem.6" At the same time, the Ministerio Ptiblico was reorganized and
given substantial independence from the Executive branch.66 Part of
that reorganization included increasing the number of prosecutors in
the Ministerio Pitblico from approximately thirty in 1994 to over 700
today.17 The State has also recently restructured and improved the
police forces, instituting the Policia Nacional Civil ("PNC"), the
National Civilian Police. The PNC replaced former police forces,
which were tainted by corruption and military infiltration. 8 The
U.N., the European Union, and the United States have provided ex-
tensive amounts of international aid targeting these and further jus-
tice reform efforts in Guatemala.69
The reforms and initiatives noted above indicate that Guatemala
has improved its justice system, at least on paper. 0 The current sys-
65. An inquisitorial system relies on extensive pre-trial investigations and in-
terrogations; the Judicial branch is largely responsible for conducting pre-trial in-
vestigations. In addition, much of the trial proceedings are written rather than oral.
Conversely, under an adversarial system, prosecutors, not judges, are responsible
for investigations, and the proceedings are largely oral. See Hendrix, supra note
11. at 392-94.
66. See, e.g., id. at 393.
67. See Interview with Luis Ramirez, Director, Instituto de Estudios Compara-
dos en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala [Guatemalan Institute of Comparative
Criminal Law], in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Ramirez Inter-
view] (on file with author).
68. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 777-79 (describing generally the train-
ing and responsibilities of PNC members).
69. See Hendrix, supra note 11, at 413-18 (detailing the efforts of the U.S.
Agency for International Development ("USAID") and MINUGUA, along with the
efforts of the Guatemalan government, to implement reform); see also Interview
with Brian Treacy, Coordinator General, USAID, Programa de Justicia [Justice
Program], in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Treacy Interview] (on
file with author); Interview with Jos~fina Coutifio, Asesora del Representante
Residente [Advisor to the Resident Representative], United Nations Development
Program ("UNDP"), in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Coutifio In-
terview] (on file with author).
70. See, e.g., LaRue Interview, supra note 16; see also Interview with Miguel
Angel Racancoj, Diputado [Congressman], Presidente Comision de Derechos Ilu-
manos [President, Human Rights Commission] (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Ra-
cancoj Interview] (on file with author); Ramirez Interview, supra note 67; Villeda
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tem, therefore, theoretically provides a means for the State to fulfill
its legal obligation to provide timely justice in the massacre cases.
The State, however, has largely failed to put the system into prac-
tice.7' The challenge for Guatemala is not a radical restructuring, but
rather to make its practices conform to the principles of justice al-
ready established.
III. OBSTACLES TO THE FULFILLMENT OF
GUATEMALA'S LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Under international and domestic law, the Guatemalan State has a
legal duty to investigate and provide an effective remedy in the mas-
sacre cases. 72 The State's failure to comply with its duty to date has
perpetuated a culture of impunity in which State agents who were re-
sponsible for the massacres need not fear punishment." The unchal-
lenged power of military and paramilitary forces that regularly per-
formed clandestine operations gave rise to this culture of impunity.
"
Many of the intellectual authors of the violence retain power and
status and remain free from investigation and prosecution. "5
The delegation, through its interviews and research, has identified
a number of specific obstacles that prevent investigation and effec-
tive remedy in the massacre cases. The obstacles are as follows: (1)
Interview, supra note 47.
71. See, e.g., Ramirez Interview, supra note 67, see also Racancoj Interview,
supra note 70; Villeda Interview, supra note 47.
72. See supra Part II (detailing the factors contributing to Guatemala's failure
to fulfill its legal obligations under domestic and international law).
73. See REMHI REPORT, supra note 1, at xxxiii (stating that impunity stems
from a lack of accountability).
74. See id.; see also MINUGUA SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at VI. 135 (ex-
plaining the armed forces' expansion of influence without any controls). One of
"the root causes of impunity is the autonomy enjoyed by the Army in its counterin-
surgency and anti-subversive activities." RUSSELL, supra note 8, at 27 (citing the
Fourth Report of the Director of the United Nations Mission for the Verification of
Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive
Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala, at 29, U.N. Doe. A/50/878 (1996)).
75. See REMHI REPORT, supra note 1, at xxxiii (describing the poor record of
investigation and prosecution of crimes against humanity).
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intimidation of witnesses and officials; (2) corruption of officials; (3)
incompetence of officials; (4) inadequate resources and resource
management; (5) the lack of a definition of military secrets; and (6)
misuse and failure to utilize procedural mechanisms. This part of the
report discusses these obstacles in the context of several massacre
cases including Plan de Sdnchez, Rio Negro, Dos Erres, and Cuarto
Pueblo, and recommends State responses to deal with them.
B. THE OBSTACLES TO JUSTICE
1. Intimidation
One of the chief causes of the State's failure to investigate and
provide an effective remedy in the massacre cases is intimidation of
and threats against officials in the justice system and against wit-
nesses.7 ' Threats mainly come from former military personnel and
former members of the now dissolved paramilitary Civil Patrols
("PACs") who fear prosecution." Such threats affect the judicial pro-
cess by reducing the will of prosecutors and judges to pursue cases
vigorously and to adjudicate them impartially. 8 Threats against wit-
nesses deter them from testifying and from urging prosecutors to
move cases forward.
76. See Civil and Political Rights, Including Questions of: Independence of the
Judiciary, Administration of Justice, Impunity, Addendum, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Mr. Param Coona-
raswamy, U.N. ESCOR, 56th sess., at paras. 34-37, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/61/Add.1 (2000) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers] (describing the threats and intimidation
by judicial actors); see also DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 768-77 (detailing inci-
dents of threats against witnesses); Interview with Marco Antonio Aguilar Palma,
Procurador Adjunto, Procurador de los Derechos Humanos [Adjunct Human
Rights Ombudsman], in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Aguilar In-
terview].
77. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Law-
yers, supra note 76.
78. See, e.g., id. at para. 36 (finding that the vulnerability of judges to undue
influence "had posed a serious threat to the independence of the judiciary, as it ap-
pears that judges have demonstrated an unwillingness to pursue cases concerning
controversial violations of human rights, thus undermining the fight to due process
of law").
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As part of the Guatemalan State's obligations under international
law to promote timely justice in the massacre cases, the State has
several specific obligations requiring it to combat intimidation. First,
threats against the judiciary violate the U.N. Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary.74 Second, threats against lawyers or
witnesses violate the U.N. Principles. Article 15 of the U.N. Princi-
ples calls for the protection of witnesses, complainants, and families
of victims." Article 4 requires that prosecutors be permitted to per-
form their functions without intimidation or improper interference.'
In addition, the U.N. Principles obligate prosecutors to prosecute
cases of corruption and threats against judges, lawyers, and victims."
a. Threats Against the Judiciary
Substantial evidence suggests that threats against judges are com-
mon and affect all levels of the judiciary, including local judges in
the Courts of First Instance, 3 Appeals Court judges, and Supreme
Court Justices.8 In the past three years, more than 160 judicial offi-
cials have complained to the Supreme Court about receiving death
threats." Judges presiding over cases involving military defendants
have had threats mailed and phoned in to them,"' and mock bombs
79. See United Nations, Basic Principles on the Independence i the Judiczary,
at para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/REV.1 (1985) (stating that judges must be
able to act independently of any influences, either direct or indirect).
80. U.N. Principles, supra note 37, art. 15.
81. Id. art. 18.
82. Id.
83. The Court of the First Instance is the first court in which a case is heard.
Overseen by one judge, the court supervises the investigatory phase and handles
the preliminary finding of sufficient cause to proceed with the case. See CODiGO
PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 48, art. 47.
84. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 770 (noting, for example, that observers
found credible evidence of judicial bias and harassment of judges in the Xaman
massacre case); see also Justice Barreda Interview, supra note 14: Inter 'iew with
Luis Alfredo Morales L6pez, Judge, Court of the First Instance. Salamfi, in
Salami., Guat. (Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Morales Interview].
85. FUNDACION MYRNA MACK, THE CENTER OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
MYRNA MACK FOUNDATION REPORT (June 1999).
86. See, e.g., DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 780 (discussing the various death
threats received by judges in the Xaman massacre case and the Bishop Gerardi
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delivered,87 all with the implicit or explicit threat that they would be
killed if they continued on the case.
The frequency and effect of such threats against the judiciary is
difficult to measure. Many threats go unreported and judges are re-
luctant to acknowledge actions taken in response to threats. Even so,
there are relatively visible responses of judges to threats, including
resignations, requests for transfers, or recusal from cases.88 It is clear
from the number of threats and the reaction of some judges that the
prosecution of massacre cases has been adversely affected. 89 The
progress of court cases has been slowed and, in some instances, evi-
dence has been suppressed and defendants freed as a result of the
threats.9° According to Jorgan Andrews, United States Department of
State Human Rights Officer, these failures of the judiciary are attrib-
utable to continued threats from the military; "[a] military legacy [of
intimidation] explains the timidity of the judiciary." 9'
For instance, Judge Henry Monroy, the presiding judge on the
Myma Mack investigation, was threatened after ordering three senior
military officials to stand trial for the murder of Myma Mack.92 Ms.
Mack, a Guatemalan anthropologist, was allegedly murdered by a
member of the Estado Mayor Presidencial ("EMP"), the Presidential
General Staff, and another assailant, in retaliation for her fieldwork
on the massacres of indigenous communities by the military during
the counterinsurgency.93 Because of the threats, Judge Monroy sub-
murder case).
87. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MYRNA MACK CASE,
§ 7 (Jan. 2000) (noting that the judge in the Myma Mack case resigned two weeks
after receiving the mock bomb).
88. See Morales Interview, supra note 84.
89. See Interview with Lic. Enrico Men6ndez, District Attorney, Salama, in
Salama, Guat. (Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Men~ndez Interview].
90. See id.
91. Interview with Jorgan Andrews, Human Rights Officer, United States Em-
bassy, in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Andrews Interview] (on
file with author).
92. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 775 (reporting the sudden resignation of
Judge Henry Monr6y due to threats and intimidation).
93. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 87, § 2, at 2
(detailing the background of the Myrna Mack investigation).
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sequently resigned, significantly slowing the advancement of that
case.
94
In a more extreme example, one judge on the Rio Negro massacre
case was almost killed, apparently by an army-backed mob." That
case stems from an alleged massacre by the Guatemalan military and
PACs in the village of Rio Negro."' The military and PACs allegedly
killed approximately 250 people, a significant portion of the village's
population.97 The case did not progress until three of the former
PACs were caught attempting to cover up evidence in the mass
graves."' Once incarcerated for the crime of grave robbing, they were
charged with and convicted of murder for their role in the Rio Negro
massacre, for which the court sentenced them to death.i An appellate
court subsequently overturned the convictions and remanded the case
for retrial.'
During the September 1999 retrial of the three defendants, over
200 men arrived armed with clubs and stones at the courthouse in
military vehicles." Nearly all the men were allegedly ex-PACs from
Xococ, the home village of the defendants. 2 According to various
94. See id., § 7, at 1 (indicating that Judge Monr6y had received a mock pack-
age bomb and was the victim of other acts of intimidation that resulted in his res-
ignation).
95. See DOS Report, supra note 4, at 772 (reporting how the trial court judge
experienced death threats from mobs who were attempting to free three former
PAC members).
96. See id. at 772 (summarizing the Rio Negro case and the attempts at prose-
cution related to it); see also Men~ndez Interview, supra note 89 (noting that
Men~ndez is the prosecutor responsible for the Rio Negro case); Seils Interview,
supra note 2 (CALDH provides legal advice for the Rio Negro victims and their
families).
97. DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 772.
98. See Interview with Jesis T~cu, Founder, Widows and Orphans of Rabinal,
in Rabinal, Guat. (Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Tticu Interview].
99. DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 772.
100. See Interview with representative of Widows and Orphans of Rabinal who
requested anonymity, in Rabinal, Guat. (Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Widows and
Orphans of Rabinal Interview] (on file with author); see also REMHI REPORT, su-
pra note 1, Versi6n Espafiol, vol. III, at 188-91.
101. See Widows and Orphans of Rabinal Interview, supra note 100; see also
REMIHI REPORT, supra note 1, Versi6n Espafiol, vol. III, at 188-91.
102. See Widows and Orphans of Rabinal Interview, supra note 100; see also
2001] 1139
AMx. U. INT'L L. REV.
eyewitnesses, the men arrived at the courthouse in trucks belonging
to the military base in Cobdn. '3 They approached the jail, attempted
to free the three defendantsjO4 and threatened to kill the trial judge if
the defendants were not released.' 5 Eventually, police reinforcements
arrived and dispersed the mob.'06 This incident was apparently a di-
rect effort to intimidate the judge, as well as all the officials of the
justice system involved in the proceeding. Moreover, the use of
military vehicles for the transport of the rioters indicates the likeli-
hood that the military organized and participated in the acts of in-
timidation.
Although the judiciary has attempted to address the problem of
threats against judges, it has failed to combat the problem effectively.
For example, when judges are assigned a security detail, they must
pay for the room and board of their bodyguards-an expense that is
impossible for most to bear, given their current salaries. 0 7 Once en-
acted, a new initiative to create a special protective unit under the
control of the judiciary, specifically trained and assigned to protect
judges, may relieve some of the problems.""' Until judges are able to
act without fear of reprisal, however, they will be unable to effec-
tively fulfill their duties.
b. Threats Against the Ministerio Pi.blico
Reports of threats against officials of the Ministerio Pfiblico are
also common.' °9 Although threats occur at all levels of the Ministerio
REMHI REPORT, supra note 1, Versi6n Espafiol, vol. III, at 188-9 1.
103. See Thcu Interview, supra note 98. Jestss Tcu is a survivor of the massacre
at Rio Negro and the key witness in the Rio Negro case. Id.
104. See Seils Interview, supra note 2.
105. DOS Report, supra note 4, at 772.
106. Id. at 772.
107. See Morales Interview, supra note 84; Justice Barreda Interview, supra
note 14.
108. See Justice Barreda Interview, supra note 14.
109. See Aguilar Interview, supra note 76; see also Men~ndez Interview, supra
note 89; Morales Interview, supra note 84; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, supra note 76, at para. 34 (noting that,
among other persons, prosecutors involved in human rights cases are "subjected to
threats, intimidation and harassment").
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Pfiblico, most are directed against local prosecutors who have direct
responsibility for prosecuting cases including the massacre cases."'
The effect of such threats is often a delay in the prosecution of those
responsible. Prosecutors who are threatened in massacre cases may
intentionally allow those cases to go uninvestigated or may actively
impede prosecution by, for example, losing files.'"
According to some observers, the slow progress of the Dos Erres
massacre case illustrates the effects of threats against prosecutors."2
On December 6, 1982, the army allegedly entered the village of Dos
Erres and ordered people to line up, separating the men and
women. ' Soldiers allegedly blocked the roads to the village, pre-
venting anyone outside the cordon from entering Dos Erres. '" On
December 8, 1982, at three o'clock, residents of Las Cruces, a
nearby village, heard detonations and shots from Dos Erres.' At
least 250 people were killed in the massacre."'
The investigation into the massacre began with an exhumation in
1994 after Familiares de los Desaparecidos de Guatemala
("FAMDEGUA"), Families of the Disappeared of Guatemala,"' filed
110. See Men~ndez Interview, supra note 89.
111. See Telephone Interview with Lic. Mynor Mt6lgar, former lead prosecutor
on many high-profile human rights cases, including the Myrna Mack and Dos Er-
res cases (Mar. 28, 2000) [hereinafter M6Igar Telephone Interview] (on file with
author).
112. See Interview with Lic. Aura Elena Farfin, Member of the Board of Di-
rectors, Familiares de los Desaparecidos de Guatemala (FAMDEGUA") [Fami-
lies of the Disappeared of Guatemala], in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 14, 2000) [here-
inafter Farfdn Interview].
113. See Patricia Bemardi et al., x'humning Political liolence in Guatemala:
Forensic Anthropology and the Investigation of Human Right I'iolations in "'Dos
Rs, " El Peten, Guatemala 20 (providing a description of the Dos Erres massacre
and the events leading up to it as compiled from witness testimony); see also
RUSSELL, supra note 8, at 41-44 (recounting the details of the Dos Erres massacre).
114. See Bernardi et al., supra note 113, at 20 (describing the soldiers' move-
ment within the village prior to the day of the massacre).
115. Id.
116. RUSSELL, supra note 8, at 44.
117. FAMDEGUA is a human rights group that advocates on behalf of persons
who were disappeared and killed during the internal conflict.
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a complaint."8 The forensic anthropologists uncovered the remains of
162 bodies, some of which were found piled in a well." 9 Despite the
skeletal remains and other overwhelming evidence provided by the
forensic anthropologists, the original local prosecutor refused to
prosecute the case.'20 According to the private prosecutor for the vic-
tims, 2' the primary reason the State prosecutor refused to bring the
case was because he feared that he and his family would be in dan-
ger; former military personnel had threatened his life.' Eventually,
the case was able to proceed through the appointment of a special
prosecutor. 12
The Bishop Juan Gerardi murder case,' " however, illustrates that
the appointment of a special prosecutor does not ensure that a case
will be unimpeded by threats. Lic. Celvin Galindo, the special prose-
cutor on the case, was forced into exile after he began subpoenaing
military officials.2 2 Galindo reported that he received threats from
118. See Bernardi et al., supra note 113, at 22-30.
119. See id. at 32 (describing the anthropological study of the 162 recovered
skeletal remains).
120. See Farfdn Interview, supra note 112.
121. In the Guatemalan legal system, victims may be represented in proceedings
by a querellante adhesivo, or private prosecutor. The private prosecutor may com-
pel the public prosecutor to conduct specific investigations during the investigative
phase through the judge of the Court of the First Instance. The private prosecutor
may also introduce evidence and call witnesses at trial, and conduct examinations
of prosecution and defense witnesses. See CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note
48, arts. 116-23. Because most victims lack the resources to pay a private prose-
cutor, one is not available for every massacre case, and even where there is a pri-
vate prosecutor, it is still difficult to pursue investigations. See Farfiin Interview,
supra note 112.
122. See Farfdn Interview, supra note 112.
123. In certain cases, the Attorney General may appoint a Special Prosecutor
[Fiscal Especial] to handle significant or difficult cases. See Ley Organica del
Ministerio Pdiblico, Decreto Nilmero 40-94 [Organic Law of the Public Ministry,
Decree No. 40-94], passed May 2, 1994, amended by Decreto Nfimero 135-97
[Decree No. 135-97],passed Dec. 10, 1997, art. 44.
124. Bishop Gerardi, head of the Office for Human Rights of the Archdiocese of
Guatemala ("ODHA") and the driving force behind the REMHI Report, was mur-
dered two days after the release of that Report. See Francisco Goldman, Murder
Comes for the Bishop, NEW YORKER, Mar. 15, 1999, at 60 (providing details of the
events leading up to the murder of Bishop Gerardi).
125. See Farfin Interview, supra note 112.
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anonymous sources and was subject to surveillance by military per-
sonnel.'26
Apparently as a result of threats against the Ministerio Pilblico,
prosecutors fail to prosecute cases vigorously. The responsibility to
prosecute, thus, improperly falls to the victim, or the private prose-
cutor. For example, in the Rio Negro case, the case went forvard
only after the victims, with the help of NGOs, had developed the
evidence and pressured the Ministerio Pitblico.'2'
c. Threats Against Witnesses and Human Rights Groups
In addition to threats against judges and prosecutors, it has been
reported that the military and PACs frequently make threats against
witnesses and victims to discourage them from testifying or pursuing
investigations.'# These threats have the effect of both deterring in-
vestigations before they have begun and delaying them once they are
underway. Such threats are particularly effective because the wit-
nesses have already suffered at the hands of those who are making
the threats and have seen them carried out firsthand. Indeed, threats
often appear to come from regional military bases or from former
PACs living in the same village as the witnesses.'#
For example, according to Jesiis T~cu, a survivor and lead witness
in the Rio Negro case who now works with the victims' families in
the Plan de Sdnchez case, the military has threatened witnesses and
human rights groups in both cases."" Shortly after the exhumations of
mass graves first began in Rabinal, the municipality in which both
the villages of Plan de Sdnchez and Rio Negro are located, the Re-
gional Military Commander convened a meeting of the men from the
126. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 775 (reporting how Galindo was not
only subject to wiretapping and surveillance but was also threatened by "an uncon-
firmed plot to kidnap one of his children").
127. See Thcu Interview, supra note 98.
128. See Monsignor Mario Rios Montt Interview, Director, ODHA, in Guat.
City, Guat. (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Monsignor Rios Montt Interview] (com-
menting that his office receives complaints of threats to witnesses); see also
Ramirez Interview, supra note 67; Tcu Interview, supra note 98.
129. See Tcu Interview, supra note 98.
130. See id.
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surrounding villages.'3 ' He allegedly told them that if they proceeded
with exhumations, la violencia and the massacres of the past would
return.'32
Tcu also alleged that troops in the same region have visited the
sites of the exhumations and said to the victims' family members
that, despite the recent shift in politics, "when the laws change, we
will come back and kill the widows."'33 In spite of these explicit
threats, local human rights activists have continued their efforts to
exhume mass graves in their villages and to pressure the government
to investigate and prosecute those responsible. Even so, according to
Tcu, threats have deterred some witnesses from testifying or pursu-
ing investigations into the massacre cases.114
In another case, Paul Seils, a legal advisor to the witnesses and
families of the victims in the Cuarto Pueblo massacre, stated that the
military called survivors of the massacre to a regional army base in
the Ixcdin, Military Zone 22.' Military personnel reportedly pres-
sured the survivors not to continue with their complaint, implying
that such action would trigger a return of la violencia. 6 The military
also allegedly promised titles to land in the Ixcdn to survivors who
agreed to drop or not join the complaint against army personnel."37
According to Seils, such actions by the military, an obvious attempt
to obstruct judicial process, constituted both intimidation and cor-
ruption. "'
Even ex-military personnel can become the targets of these threats.
In the Dos Erres case, two former Kaibiles, or special forces troops,
became witnesses for the prosecution by testifying about the massa-









139. See Interview with Dos Erres Witnesses Who Requested Anonymity, in
Flores, Guatemala (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Dos Erres Witness Interview].
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the two men intended to testify, the military allegedly threatened
their lives. Because of the threats, the two witnesses were forced to
flee Guatemala; they have been granted temporary asylum in another
country.140
d. Recommendations
The government of Guatemala should address the problem of
threats by providing greater protection for judges, prosecutors, and
civilians involved in the prosecution of massacre cases. The judiciary
has planned and funded a specially trained protective force, and
should immediately implement this special protection force for at-
risk judges, particularly those involved in the massacre cases. The
Ministerio Pfiblico should also implement special protective meas-
ures to ensure that prosecutors are free from intimidation.
The Law for the Protection of Judicial Actors, passed by the Gua-
temalan Congress in 1996, requires that witnesses, judges, and
prosecutors subject to intimidation be protected.' The program lacks
funds and, therefore, has not been implemented.": The establishment
of a well-funded and effective witness protection program is essen-
tial to ensure witnesses' sufficient confidence in their own safety to
testify in massacre cases. Although witness protection is declared to
be a priority, neither the Ministerio P(iblico, the body responsible for
funding the program, nor the police is effective in protecting wit-
143
nesses.
Protection for those threatened by the military and former PACs is
not enough. The PNC should implement a special investigative unit
for threats against judicial actors, and prosecution of those cases
should be a priority within the Ministerio PtIblico. Aggressive prose-
cution of those who threaten judges and impede justice would deter
future threats and reduce impunity. The Ministerio PtIblico should
140. See id.
141. See Ley Para la Protecci6n de Sujetos Procesales y Personas Vinculadas a
la Administraci6n de Judicia Penal, Decreto Nimero 70-96 [Law for the Protection
of Administrative Staff and Persons Related to the Administration of Criminal
Justice, Decree No. 70-96], passed Aug. 27, 1996.
142. See Mack Interview, supra note 14.
143. See Men6ndez Interview, supra note 89.
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focus attention on the investigation and prosecution of those respon-
sible for the threats. Military personnel or government officials who
are responsible for threats should be removed from their positions
and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
2. Corruption
The Guatemalan justice system was largely marginalized during
the internal armed conflict.'" Justice Jos6 Quezada, President of the
Supreme Court, stated that "during the 36 year conflict.., there was
really no administration of justice."'145 The State was reportedly pre-
occupied with the insurgency and ignored the deterioration of judi-
cial integrity. 46 As a result, corruption became a significant problem
and now reportedly permeates every level of the justice system.'"7
While government officials are allegedly responsible for much of the
corruption, private landowners, PACs, and former military personnel
may also improperly influence the functioning of the justice sys-
tem.1
4 8
Part of the Guatemalan State's legal duty to investigate and pro-
vide an effective remedy in the massacre cases is found in the spe-
cific obligations it has concerning corruption. Guatemala has an ob-
ligation to remedy corruption under the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption (the "Convention Against Corruption").14 9 The
OAS has promulgated the Convention Against Corruption, which
144. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Laiyers, supra note 76, at para. 141.
145. Interview with Jos6 Quezada, President of the Supreme Court, in Guat.
City, Guat. (Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Justice Quezada Interview] (on file with
author).
146. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, supra note 76, at para. 141.
147. See id.; see also Justice Barreda Interview, supra note 14; Hendrix, supra
note I1, at 370 (quoting the former President of the Supreme Court as stating that
corruption is "one of the major problems facing the Guatemalan justice system,
including within the judicial branch").
148. See Justice Barreda Interview, supra note 14.
149. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, pream-
ble, 35 I.L.M. 724, at http://www.oas.org/EN/PROG/JURIDICO/english/Treaties/
b-58.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2001) (citing the "responsibility of States to hold
corrupt persons accountable in order to combat corruption").
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recognizes the social cost of corrupt public institutions,'" and calls
for the adoption of specific measures to reduce its impact.' Al-
though Guatemala has not ratified the convention, the State is a sig-
natory and is therefore obligated to use best efforts to comply with its
principles until its ratification.' 2 Guatemala is therefore obligated to
address this pervasive problem, particularly where corruption leads
to violation of its other duties under international and domestic law.
This duty is also set forth in the Comprehensive Agreement on Hu-
man Rights from the Peace Accords.'"'
Corruption reportedly takes a variety of forms, all of which affect
the resolution of massacre cases through improper influence by
military personnel in both the judiciary and the Ministerio Pxblico."'
The most obvious form is direct corruption through bribes to preju-
dice specific judgments and resolutions of cases.'" A more subtle
form is the use of influence within the government to manipulate the
assignment of prosecutors or judges, so that the officials most capa-
ble of handling complex massacre cases are not always assigned to
such cases.'56 Both kinds of corruption greatly undermine the State's
prosecution efforts.
a. Corruption in the Judiciary
i. Briber ,
Bribery in the judiciary appears to be a significant problem.
Judges' traditionally low salaries'"7 have left the judiciary susceptible
to corruption. In addition, most judges are not given adequate pro-
150. See id.
151. See generally id.
152. See Vienna Convention, supra note 20, art. 18 (obliging States to "refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty" that they have
signed but have not yet ratified).
153. See supra note 266 and accompanying text (setting forth Guatemala's du-
ties under the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights).
154. See Mack Interview, supra note 14.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at * 18.
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tection from intimidation and threats. If judges want protection, they
themselves must pay for the room and board of their bodyguards,"'
which adds to the financial pressure. The State has recently initiated
reforms through the Judicial Career Law, which will increase the
wages, provide some training for judges, and change the way com-
plaints about judges are handled."9 While the effects of the Judicial
Career Law remain to be seen, corruption through bribery reportedly
continues to be a significant problem within the judiciary. "
The problem of judicial corruption is illustrated by the Xaman
massacre case. The massacre took place in October 1995 when a
group of soldiers allegedly entered the village of Xaman and opened
fire on the unarmed inhabitants who were gathered for a celebra-t. 161
tion. According to Lic. Claudia Samay6a, Director of the Rigoberta
Menchfi Foundation, at least one of the judges presiding over the
case was offered 500,000 Quetzales (roughly US$83,000 at the time)
to make evidentiary rulings in favor of the defendants.'62 When the
judge refused the bribe, his life was threatened. ' Because of that
threat, the judge attempted to recuse himself from the case.'14
Such reports of corruption raise questions regarding other irregu-
larities in the Xaman case. 65 For example, one judge ruled that de-
spite the fact that the military opened fire on a group of unarmed ci-
vilians, killing eleven, the soldiers' actions were "unintentional.' 6 6
They were merely found guilty of negligent homicide, a crime that
158. See Justice Barreda Interview, supra note 14; see also Morales Interview,
supra note 84.
159. See Ley de la Carrera Judicial, Decreto Nfimero 41-99 [Judicial Career
Law, Decree No. 41-99], passed Oct. 27, 1999 [hereinafter Judicial Career Law].
160. See Quezada Interview, supra note 145.
161. See Interview with Claudia Samay6a, Director, Rigoberta Mench6i Founda-
tion, in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Samay6a Interview].
162. See id. (stating that the judge wishes to remain anonymous); see also DOS
REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
163. See Samay6a Interview, supra note 161.
164. See id.
165. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 770.
166. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Law-
yers, supra note 76, at para. 49; see also DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-8.
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does not exist under Guatemalan law.'"" Although it is difficult to as-
certain the extent to which bribes influence such outcomes in specific
cases, the problem appears to be pervasive."
ii. Political Cor-uption / Trafficking of Inluence
According to Monsignor Mario Rios Montt, Director of the Hu-
man Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala ("ODHA"),
most judges in recent years have obtained their appointments through
political connections and favors, rather than through merit or abil-
ity.169 This politicized process reportedly creates a system in which
judges, who may not even be qualified for their positions, are in-
debted to government officials or private citizens who were influen-
tial in their appointment to the bench.'" The "trafficking of influ-
ence" creates a lack of impartiality among judges,'' and may extend
to the highest levels of the judiciary.' 2
When a judge has been appointed through political connections,
that judge may be asked to use his or her position improperly to alter
the outcome of politically significant cases such as the massacre
cases. A judge may dismiss cases, fail to issue arrest warrants, allow
pre-trial release of suspects, make improperly favorable evidentiary
rulings for the defense, or affect the prosecution through other ad-
ministrative procedures of the court."' These abuses have reportedly
167. See Interview with Napoleon Guti~rrez Vargas, Justce, Supreme Court of
Justice, Criminal Section, in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Justice
Guti~rrez Interview]; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independ-
ence of Judges and Lau5yers, supra note 76.
168. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 767 (observing that intimidation of wit-
nesses, prosecutors, and judges is a pervasive problem).
169. See Monsignor Rios Montt Interview, supra note 128.
170. See MINUGUA SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at pam. 140; see also Inter-
view with Javier Mfnem, Director, Cobin office of MINUGUA, in Cobin, Guat.
(Mar. 14, 2000) [hereinafter M.nem Interview].
171. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 770.
172. See id. at 18 (noting that a 1996 firing of 500 employees by the judiciary
has been criticized as politically motivated).
173. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 781.
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delayed and sometimes derailed the investigation and prosecution of
174
massacre cases.
Much of the delay in the Rio Negro case17 1 is allegedly the result of
undue influence on the judges. 76 For example, judges reportedly
have slowed the progress of the Rio Negro massacre case by em-
ploying administrative obstacles in response to political influence.'
77
According to the prosecutor on the Rio Negro case, "when politics
walks in the door, justice leaps out the window," and this apparently
is what happened in the Rio Negro case.'78 Although there have been
three convictions of former civil patrollers who participated in the
massacre, the intellectual authors of the crime as well as other former
military defendants named in the complaint have not been prose-
cuted.' 79 The judiciary has failed to take the active role newly re-
quired by the CPP in supervising and expediting the investigation of
the Rio Negro case. 8 0
Given the historic lack of effective supervision of the judiciary, a
greater need for scrutiny of the courts is required. 8' The judiciary has
recently instituted a new review process for judges that may help
curb incompetence and corruption. 2 Additionally, the judiciary, the
Ministerio Pfiblico, and the PNC are instituting training in judicial
and prosecutorial ethics.' 3 These steps, though welcome, are not
likely to prove sufficient to address the problem of judicial corrup-
tion.
b. Corruption in the Ministerio Pfiblico
As with the judiciary, some prosecutors reportedly have been ap-
174. See Samay6a Interview, supra note 161.
175. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
176. See Seils Interview, supra note 2.
177. See id.
178. Men~ndez Interview, supra note 89.
179. See Tcu Interview, supra note 98 and accompanying text.
180. See CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 48, arts. 24-31.





pointed through political connections, sometimes with little regard
for their abilities or training."' The politicized appointment process
leaves prosecutors open to undue influence and corruption. Although
it may be difficult to prove improper action in a particular case, a
pattern of non-prosecution, apparent intentional mishandling of evi-
dence and case files, and administrative delays raise questions re-
garding the professionalism and independence of prosecutors."5
For example, a case against a former PAC member charged with
the murder of presidential candidate Jorge Carpio and three others
was dismissed due to the unexplained disappearance of key ballistic
evidence from the Ministerio Pfiblico's custody. '" Similarly,
FAMDEGUA detailed a series of abuses that were the result of cor-
ruption or incompetence in the Dos Erres massacre case, including
mishandling of case files and evidence that delayed prosecution.
Such delay tactics are common to massacre cases.
The Ministerio POiblico reportedly has engaged in subtle pressur-
ing of witnesses to discourage them from testifying."' According to a
survivor and lead witness in the Rio Negro case, prosecutors told
witnesses that if they continued to go ahead with the case, they
would be killed by the military.'" Instead of taking steps to protect
witnesses, prosecutors have relayed such second-hand threats,
thereby discouraging victims and witnesses from testifying. Former
military personnel, many of whom reportedly were participants in the
atrocities of the internal conflict, permeate the Ministerio Ptlblico.Y'
184. See MINUGUA SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, at para. 140 (outlining the
deficiencies of the judiciary due to a lack of legal training, which, in turn, contrib-
utes to bad legal habits and practices); see also Monsignor Rios Monti Interview,
supra note 128.
185. See Farfin Interview, supra note 112; see also Seils Interview, supra note
2; T~cu Interview, supra note 98.
186. See id.
187. See Farfdn Interview, supra note 112.
188. See Farfdn Interview, supra note 112; see also Seils Interview, supra note
2; Tcu Interview, supra note 98.
189. See Thcu Interview, supra note 98.
190. See id.
191. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, supra note 76, at para. 141; see also LaRue Interview, supra note 16; In-
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Where the military has infiltrated the Ministerio Piblico, they have
the opportunity to mishandle cases, corrupt evidence, and use their
position to learn the names and locations of witnesses. 192 This under-
mines the mandate of the institution, as former military personnel are
able to exert their influence to deter prosecution of massacre cases.
The military reportedly also exerts external influence through cor-
ruption and intimidation of prosecutors and judges.' 94
Powerful landowners appear to have been another source of im-
proper political influence on the impartial resolution of cases. These
landowners exert significant control over local affairs. Some of the
massacres, such as Pichec and Plan de Sdnchez, occured on land
owned by private individuals. Landowners, some of whom have been
implicated in oppression against the local indigenous people, have
used their influence to impede investigation efforts."' In addition,
landowners have allegedly threatened witnesses directly. 
96
In one example, a local landowner, whose family owns a hydroe-
lectric plant that powers much of southern Guatemala, allegedly used
his influence to suppress the investigation of the Tres Aguas exhu-
mation located on his property.97 The prosecutor responsible for that
terview with Lic. Victor Ferrigno, Director of Proyecto Pro-Leyes [Pro-Law Proj-
ect], in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Ferrigno Interview] (on file
with author); Interview with Lic. Miguel Meurth, Director, Centro De Analisis
Forense y Ciencias Aplicadas [Center for Forensic Analysis and Applied Sci-
ences], in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Meurth Interview] (on file
with author); Treacy Interview, supra note 69.
192. See Seils Interview, supra note 2; see also Report of the Special Rappor-
teur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, supra note 76, at para. 34 (not-
ing that the Special Rapporteur received allegations that the influence of the mili-
tary had "hindered the speedy, impartial administration of justice, and in some
[cases] thwarted due administration of justice").
193. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, supra note 76, at para. 34-37 (relating incidents and circumstances where
the judiciary was hampered from pursuing prosecutions due to threats).
194. See supra Parts IV.B.I.a, IV.B.2.a.i (detailing the types of threats experi-
enced by the judiciary and the problems of bribery and corruption in the judiciary).
195. See Interview with Francisco de Leon, Acting Director of the ODHA team
of forensic anthropologists, in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 14, 2000) [hereinafter de
Leon Interview] (on file with author).
196. See M6nem Interview, supra note 170.
197. See de Leon Interview, supra note 195.
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case obtained a fifteen-day warrant to initiate the exhumation. Ac-
cording to Lic. Francisco de Leon, Acting Director of the ODHA ex-
humation team, the prosecutor allowed that warrant, and two subse-
quent warrants, to expire because of the landowner's influence.' "
Although the exhumation was eventually allowed to proceed, this
provides an example of the political influence used on local prose-
cutors to slow down and discourage investigations.
c. Corruption of Witnesses by the Military
In addition to alleged threats against witnesses, military personnel
have apparently improperly influenced witness testimony through
bribery. For example, in the Cuarto Pueblo massacre case, the mili-
tary allegedly promised land and animals to the victims and survivors
of massacres to deter them from pursuing their cases.' Bribery, cou-
pled with threats of reprisal,"° has greatly limited public willingness
to assist in the prosecution of the massacre cases.
d. Non-Prosecution of Corruption
Despite the evidence of widespread corruption in the judiciary,
and in the Ministerio Pfiblico, as well as attempted bribery of wit-
nesses and survivors of the massacres by the military, the State has
failed to investigate or prosecute these acts.'"2 The inaction of the
Ministerio Pfiblico and the judiciary has permitted those responsible
for the massacres to enjoy continued impunity.
Numerous complaints of corruption were filed with the office of
the Human Rights Ombudsman.2' Although the Ombudsman's office
is empowered to investigate cases of corruption, it does not have the
198. See id.
199. See Seils Interview, supra note 2.
200. See supra Part IV.B.1 (describing the intimidation brought to bear on offi-
cials of the justice system by former members of the military).
201. See Mnem Interview, supra note 170.
202. See Aguilar Interview, supra note 76; see also Hendrix, supra note 11, at
369 (stating that although there are basic laws against corruption, there is a lack of
enforcement and compliance); DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 780.
203. See Aguilar Interview, supra note 76.
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resources to handle those investigations.2°  Even if the office had
such resources, the Ombudsman does not have the mandate to prose-
cute those responsible. 5 To the extent that this corruption goes un-
punished, it will remain an obstacle to the effective investigation and
prosecution of the massacre cases.
e. Recommendations
To address the problem of corruption, the State must target both
those who traffic in influence and bribe government officials and
those who accept bribes. The State should establish an independent
office to investigate and prosecute those who bribe judicial officers
or otherwise attempt to influence the judiciary, the Ministerio
Piblico, or witnesses.0 6 Such an office should also prosecute those
who accept bribes or who yield to other forms of influence." ' It
should also be empowered to take complaints directly from the pub-
lic. To ensure transparency, this office should include representatives
from the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman20 and human
rights NGOs, and publish reports for public dissemination.
The politicized appointment process leaves prosecutors open to in-
fluence and corruption. Although there is an initiative to appoint
prosecutors through a training program, thus creating a merit-based
appointment process, it only applies to new prosecutors. Current
prosecutors in the Ministerio Piblico, who have been appointed
through a politicized process, are not subject to the training program.
Therefore, this initiative does not sufficiently combat corruption in
the Ministerio Pdiblico.
204. See id.; see also infra Part IV.B.4.a (discussing the lack of resources Gua-
temalan legal institutions have and its deleterious effect on the administration of
justice).
205. See Aguilar Interview, supra note 76.
206. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, supra note 76, at para. 169 (f) (providing recommendations to deal with
"judicial corruption and influence peddling").
207. See id.
208. The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman operates semi-independently
from other branches of the government to assist other State institutions with human
rights issues. See Aguilar Interview, supra note 76.
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Every attempt should be made to diminish the ability of military
personnel involved in the massacres to influence the judiciary and
the Ministerio PNiblico. The State should remove former military per-
sonnel from their positions in the government who are using their in-
fluence to affect the judicial process. Civil servants who are accused
of crimes related to these massacre cases should also be removed
from positions where they may have influence over such cases. '
Judges and prosecutors must be better protected from undue influ-
ence. The implementation of protection programs in conjunction
with an increase in salaries for judges, when effectuated, may make
them less susceptible to the military's agenda. Furthermore, the State
should focus on investigating and possibly prosecuting improprieties
by judges to curb the effects of threats and bribes.
The constitutionally mandated term for judges is five years, with
the possibility of reappointment. The imposition of such a short term
politicizes the position of judges and leaves them vulnerable to cor-
ruption. The legislature should amend the Constitution to confer
lengthier terms on judges in order to reduce the influence of corrup-
tion.2'0
The judiciary and the Ministerio Pfiblico should take a greater role
in supervising the ethical education of judges and prosecutors.
Judges and prosecutors need better training in ethics, and special
rules should be promulgated regarding the professional conduct of
judges and prosecutors. The judiciary should remove judges who
violate the rules of the court by accepting bribes or by improperly
using their positions to derail prosecution of the massacre cases.
The implementation of the newly approved Judicial Career Law is
a first step in limiting corrupt practices within the judiciary.'" One
positive sign is the judiciary's implementation of the recommenda-
tions of the Commission on the Strengthening of Justice, in particular
with respect to separating responsibility for the administrative and
judicial functions of the judiciary. Such structural reform should im-
209. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence ol'Judges and Law-
yers, supra note 76, at para. 169 (b).
210. See Justice Quezada Interview, supra note 145.
211. See Judicial Career Law, supra note 159, arts. 39-41 (providing a list of ac-
tions prohibited by judges).
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prove the system's ability to discipline and remove judges where ap-
propriate.
3. Incompetence
The incompetence of some lawyers and judges in the Ministerio
Pfiblico and the judiciary has also contributed to the State's failure to
effectively investigate and prosecute massacre cases. Some prosecu-
tors lack the skills to investigate and prosecute a case effectively un-
der the recently introduced adversarial system. Judges may com-
pound the problem by mishandling procedures and misapplying the
law. To the extent it has permitted incompetence in the justice sys-
tem, the State has violated its obligation under Article 2(3) of the
ICCPR to give its citizens a right to bring their claims of a violation
of the right to life to a competent judicial, administrative, legislative,
or other authority provided for by the State's legal system.2 2 Fur-
thermore, the U.N. Principles and the U.N. Manual underscore the
duty of the State to competently investigate alleged violations of the
right to life.
213
a. Incompetence in the Ministerio Ptiblico
The State's legal duty to investigate and provide an effective rem-
edy in the massacre cases is further affected by the reported incom-
petence in the Ministerio Pfiblico. Many people within the judiciary,
the Executive branch, international organizations, and NGOs whom
the delegation interviewed, have referred to the Ministerio Pfiblico as
"the weakest link in the criminal justice system."'214 The problems
within the Ministerio Pfiblico begin with the inadequate education
212. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(3); see also supra Part II.A.1 (outlining the
international treaties that compel Guatemala to examine violations of "the right to
life" and remedies for such violations).
213. See supra Part I.A.2 (detailing those materials put out by the United Na-
tions to supplement the treaties that bind governments by providing "persuasive
authority" through "customary international law").
214. See Interview with Steve E. Hendrix, Asesor Juridico y Coordinador de
Programas de Justicia, Oficina de Iniciativas Democraticas [Judicial Advisor and
Coordinator of Justice Programs, Office of Democratic Initiatives], USAID, in
Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Hendrix Interview]; see also Monsi-
gnor Rios Montt Interview, supra note 128; Andrews Interview, supra note 91;
Aguilar Interview, supra note 76; LaRue Interview, supra note 16.
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prosecutors receive in law school.2' 5 Neither the Colegio de Aboga-
dos de Guatemala, the Guatemalan Bar Association, nor any other
organization regulates the quality of legal education. ' " Instructors
often teach from outdated texts, some of which date back several
decades.21' In addition, the Adjunct Human Rights Ombudsman and
law professor, Marco Antonio Aguilar Parma, notes that many law-
yers hold positions within the Ministerio Ptiblico in low regard. The
perception among lawyers is that lawyers who have difficulty getting
private clients seek employment with the Ministerio Pfiblico as a last
resort.21 ' This perception undermines morale within the Ministerio
Pfiblico and prevents it from attracting quality candidates.'2
A lack of training in criminal procedure under the new CPP,
which gives prosecutors significantly more responsibility in investi-
gating cases, exacerbates the incompetence of some prosecutors. 1,
For example, prosecutors often fail to follow the procedures for pre-
serving evidence by effectively sealing off crime scenes and pre-
serving the chain of custody for physical evidence. ' This mishan-
dling results in evidence that is unusable or questionable at trial.-"
More generally, many prosecutors have not effectively carried out
215. See Mack Interview, supra note 14; see also Aguilar Interview, supra note
76. Aguilar teaches law part-time at the San Carlos University. See id.
216. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence oJ Judges and
Lawyers, supra note 76, at paras. 73-76 (noting the lack of uniform standards in
legal education and the lack of testing of new law yers prior to admittance to the
bar to ensure adequate qualifications to practice law); see also Mack Interview, su-
pra note 14.
217. See Mack Interview, supra note 14; cf. Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, supra note 76, at paras. 73-76.
218. See Aguilar Interview, supra note 76; see also Andrews Interview, supra
note 91.
219. See id.
220. See Hendrix, supra note 11, at 365 (noting that the new Code is the "first of
its kind in Latin America," and supplants an 'inquisitorial system" with an "adver-
sarial system"); see also Justice Quezada Interview, supra note 145.
221. See de Leon Interview, supra note 195; see also Andrews Interview, supra
note 91; Treacy Interview, supra note 69; Menrndez interview, supra note 89.
222. See de Leon Interview, supra note 195; Andrews Interview, supra note 91;
Treacy Interview, supra note 69; Menrndez Interview, supra note 89 (stating that
evidence that is "fruit from a poisonous tree" is unusable at tnal).
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their new investigative responsibilities under the adversarial sys-
tem.
223
In addition to inadequate training, some prosecutors suffer from a
lack of commitment to their role. This may be true for several rea-
sons.2 4 Because prosecutors receive relatively low salaries compared
with the salaries that lawyers in private practice receive, the prestige
and satisfaction from working in public service is an important part
of their compensation in many countries. In Guatemala, however,
prosecutors are held in low regard and do not receive the status and
benefits conferred on prosecutors in other countries, so they often do
not take pride in representing a State with a history of corruption and
repression.1
21
As a result, some prosecutors seem to fail to understand or will-
fully ignore their role as a representative of the State and the State's
responsibility to bring prosecutions. 2 The lack of commitment to
their role as representatives of the State is reflected in prosecutors'
tendency to wait for victims or their family members to lodge com-
plaints before they investigate a crime. This is true even though they
are empowered to begin investigations themselves227 and often have
sufficient evidence in the massacre cases to do So.228
The mishandled investigation and lack of prosecutions in the
Cuarto Pueblo massacre case are examples of the apparent incompe-
tence of the Ministerio Pilblico. The massacre at Cuarto Pueblo in the
Ixcdn region of the department of Quiche occurred over three days in
March 1982, principally on March 14, 1982, a market day when resi-
dents from the surrounding countryside were gathered for shopping.
At the height of the massacre, soldiers allegedly shot civilians from
military helicopters and the ground. In an attempt to conceal the evi-
223. See infra notes 229-238 and accompanying text; see also supra note 65 and
accompanying text (emphasizing that it is the prosecutor's role to conduct pre-trial
investigations); LaRue Interview, supra note 16; Ramirez Interview, supra note
67; Mack Interview, supra note 14; Morales Interview, supra note 84.
224. See Mack Interview, supra note 14.
225. See Meurth Interview, supra note 191; Mack Interview, supra note 14.
226. See Mack Interview, supra note 14; Seils Interview, supra note 2; Farffin
Interview, supra note 112; Ramirez Interview, supra note 67.
227. See CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 48, arts. 24-25.
228. See Seils Interview, supra note 2.
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dence of the massacre, the soldiers then allegedly took the more than
300 bodies, placed them in a nearby church and set the church on
fire.2
9
The criminal investigation into the massacre began with a request
by the local justice of the peace for an exhumation on May 25,
1995.2'0 The evidence from that exhumation was transferred to Gua-
temala City for analysis, but no record of the chain of custody for
that evidence exists.2' Although the analysis yielded no positive
identifications, a fact that the prosecutor cited as the major obstacle
in prosecuting those responsible, the prosecutor personally took the
testimony of forty-one witnesses to the massacre.2' According to the
prosecutor, the statements by these witnesses are consistent with
each other and the physical evidence.'
On October 16, 1996, the prosecutor sent a letter to the Minister of
Defense requesting information about the operations in Military
Zone 22 in the Ixcd.n on March 14, 1982. The Minister did not reply
until July 24, 1997, after the prosecutor had sent a third letter re-
questing the information. The Minister responded that he could not
answer the prosecutor's questions because the military base, Zone
22, did not exist until March 23, 1983. The prosecutor requested no
further information from the Defense Minister and never confronted
him with the overwhelming evidence of the operation of numerous
military bases in the Ixcdn region on March 14, 1982.2-"
The prosecutor then sent a letter to his superior, the Attorney Gen-
eral, asking him how to proceed and requesting that the Attorney
General appoint a special prosecutor to the case. The prosecutor
229. See id. Paul Seils is the international legal director for CALDH, which
serves as a legal advisor for the victims of the Cuarto Pueblo massacre. Id.
230. See Interview with Lic. Mynor Elis o Ogildez, District Attorney for Alta
Verapaz, in Cobfin (Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Ogildez Interview]. Lic. Ogildez
is the district attorney responsible for the Cuarto Pueblo massacre case. Dunng the
delegation's meeting with Lic. Og~ldez, he looked through his office's case file on
Cuarto Pueblo and gave the delegation a detailed account of the massacre itself and
the steps his office has taken to investigate it.
231. See id.; see also Mnem Interview, supra note 170.
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never received a response to that letter and has not proceeded further
with the investigation in the Cuarto Pueblo massacre case."3 ' The
prosecutor stated to the delegation that he has not proceeded with the
case because he believes that judges, conditioned under the inquisito-
rial system, will not accept circumstantial proof of death. -"' Even
without identifications of victims, the prosecutor has forty-one con-
sistent eyewitness accounts of the massacre stating that there were
operational military bases in the Ixcdn area at the time, at least
twelve eyewitnesses who are eager to testify, " ample physical evi-
dence of a massacre, and corroborating evidence in the REMHI re-
port238 and other public records. The failure to proceed with the
prosecution in the face of such substantial evidence reflects either in-
competence or lack of commitment to the prosecutorial role.
b. Incompetence in the Judiciary
The lack of adequate training for judges affects all levels of the ju-
diciary beginning with justices of the peace. Each municipality in
Guatemala has at least one justice of the peace, who may be the only
judicial actor within the municipality.239 Justices of the peace adjudi-
cate certain types of minor cases. 4° In addition, Article 308 of the
CPP empowers justices of the peace, under the direction of the Min-
isterio Piblico, to begin investigations on larger cases where they are
the only judicial actor in the municipality. 4! For the most part, jus-
tices of the peace have no formal legal training, and most are not
235. See id.
236. Id. There is no physical evidence of the death of individuals because none
of the bodies have been identified due to the fact that only charred fragments re-
mained of their skeletons. See id.; see also infra Part IV.B.6.b (noting that without
positive identification of victims, the prosecution's investigation into the massacre
is slow to proceed).
237. See Seils Interview, supra note 2.
238. See REMHI REPORT, supra note I, at 137 (stating that the Army was in
constant contact with the base, and a helicopter provided air support for the mis-
sion). This illustrated that the massacre was the "result of strategic plans and tac-
tics in a campaign directed by the officers and carried out by the troops." Id.
239. Legal System of Guatemala, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1363, 1365 (1996).
240. See id.
241. See Ogdildez Interview, supra note 230; see also CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL,
supra note 48, art. 308.
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lawyers.4 This lack of training has led to serious procedural errors,
including the mishandling or destruction of evidence, as in the
Cuarto Pueblo case.243 Although the Judicial Career Law requires that
all justices of the peace become lawyers within the next three
years, ' the prospects for this massive undertaking do not appear
good.2 '5 In the meantime, most justices of the peace are reportedly
unqualified to carry out their duties.4
Judges of the First Instance and judges in the courts of appeals
also suffer from a lack of training, particularly with regard to the
change from the inquisitorial to the adversarial system. Under the old
inquisitorial system in Guatemala, judges were responsible for both
investigating and adjudicating cases.:4 Under the newly instituted
adversarial system, judges are no longer responsible for investigating
cases and only adjudicate. '46
According to Justice Barreda of the Guatemala Supreme Court,
many judges have been reluctant to relinquish the power over the
procedural aspects of investigations and prosecutions that the in-
quisitorial system afforded them, even though such judges do not
adequately fulfill those duties."49 Judges also need to adapt to the new
oral proceedings of the adversarial system as opposed to the largely
written proceedings of the inquisitorial system.:" Given Guatemala's
generally deficient system of legal education and the difficulties as-
sociated with switching to a new criminal procedure code, many
242. See Hendrix Interview, supra note 214.
243. See supra notes 230-236 and accompanying text. The justice of the peace
who initiated the investigation into the Cuarto Pueblo massacre took no steps to
record the chain of custody for the evidence recovered at the site of the massacre.
See id.
244. Judicial Career Law, supra note 159, art. 56.
245. See Hendrix Interview, supra note 214.
246. See id.; see also Mtnem Interview, supra note 170 (stating that a justice of
the peace failed to preserve the chain of custody for evidence in the Cuarto Pueblo
case).
247. Hendrix, supra note 11, at 393.
248. See id. (noting that in addition to moving from an inquisitorial to an adver-
sarial system, judges are also receiving new training programs).
249. See Justice Barreda Interview, supra note 14.
250. Hendrix, supra note 11, at 365.
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judges fail to understand and implement the provisions of the new
code and constitutional protections for defendants. 5
This lack of training has multiple effects. According to Enrico
Men6ndez, District Attorney for Salama, the lack of training for
judges of the first instance has led to lost cases for the State. 2 As a
result of their inadequate understanding of the law, judges have
failed to issue arrest and search warrants in a timely manner, jeop-
ardizing investigations and arrests."' Lic. Men6ndez also stated that
defendants are detained without being charged or informed of their
rights.254 When a defendant is finally tried, presiding judges often
have incomplete knowledge of key legal principles such as presump-
tion of innocence for defendants.55
The lack of knowledge of the law apparently extends to both sub-
stantive law and procedure. The actions taken by the judge in the
Xaman massacre case illustrate this point. The judge convicted the
defendants of negligent homicide with complicity, a crime that does
not exist in Guatemalan law.2 56 One Justice of the Supreme Court of
Justice commented that not only was the fabrication of a crime ab-
surd, but so was the sentence of negligent homicide in a case where
thirteen people were killed in a barrage of 288 bullets. 57
251. See Treacy Interview, supra note 69; see also Quezada Interview, supra
note 145 (stating that a lack of training for judges has led to many due process and
human rights problems); Justice Barreda Interview, supra note 14. Justice Barreda
also stated that judges delegate some of their key duties to unqualified staff, who
further contribute to the incompetent handling of cases. See id.; see also Ramirez
Interview, supra note 67.
252. See Interview with Luis Alfredo Vasquez Menrndez.
253. See Menrndez Interview, supra note 90.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, supra note 76, at paras. 48-49 (noting that the United Nations Verifica-
tion Mission in Guatemala found that the ruling in the Xaman case "served to in-
crease the climate of impunity in the country."); see also DOS REPORT, supra note
4, at 770.
257. See Justice Gutirrrez Interview, supra note 167; see generally Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, supra note 76, at
para. 50.
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c. Recommendations
The problems caused by incompetence in the Ministerio Piblico
cannot be remedied unless it attracts qualified lawyers and trains
those lawyers to work effectively under the new criminal procedure
code. One way to do that is by increasing the salaries of prosecutors.
An increase in salary would not only attract candidates who would
otherwise aim for higher paying fields;25' it would alleviate the pres-
sure on prosecutors to take private cases to supplement their in-
come.29 In addition, prosecutors must be trained in investigative
techniques, preservation of evidence, and the traditional skills in-
volved in being an effective trial attorney under the adversarial sys-
tem.260 These measures may eventually improve the status of the po-
sition of prosecutor, which would, in turn, attract more qualified
candidates.
Judges must also receive better training. Although the Judicial Ca-
reer Law and the judges' school set up by the Agreement of the
Magistrates of the Supreme Court are promising initiatives that may
raise the level of competence within the judiciary, most judges will
not receive training under this arrangement."' New candidates for ju-
dicial and justice of the peace positions are chosen by the judges'
school262 and are required to attend the school, which offers courses
designed to teach the practical, rather than theoretical, aspects of the
law and the process of judging.63 Specifically, the Judicial Career
Law requires all new judges to pass a test before being considered
for a judicial post and provides for periodic evaluation of judges.'
One serious limitation of the reforms is that these new and ambitious
training programs only apply to new judges, so that incompetent
258. See Aguilar Interview, supra note 76.
259. See Meurth Interview, supra note 191. Although prosecutors are prohibited
from taking private clients, many currently do. See ii.
260. See Aguilar Interview, supra note 76.
261. Only judges taking new positions are required to undergo training. See Ju-
dicial Career Law, supra note 159, art. 18.
262. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Law-
yers, supra note 76, at para. 64.
263. See id.
264. Only judges taking new positions are required to undergo training. See Ju-
dicial Career Law, supra note 159, art. 18.
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judges already serving on the bench need not undergo any additional
training and may remain on the bench.2 6' For this reason, the State
should require all judges to undergo training.
4. Financial and Technical Resources
The State has further failed to comply with its duty to prosecute
and provide an effective remedy in the massacre cases through its in-
adequate funding of the criminal justice system and its lack of coor-
dination among the institutions that make up that system. Article II
of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, entitled
"Strengthening Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights,"
elaborates on that duty, stating:
The Parties consider that any behavior that limits, restricts or impairs the
function assigned to the judiciary, the Counsel for Human Rights [Human
Rights Ombudsman] and the Public Prosecutor's Office in respect of hu-
man rights undermines fundamental principles of the rule of law and that,
accordingly, those institutions must be supported and strengthened in the
266
exercise of those functions.
This commitment to strengthen the institutions involved in crimi-
nal justice and human rights is of little use without adequate funding
for each institution and a commitment to coordinate these institu-
tions.
a. Lack of Financial and Technical Resources
The Guatemalan institutions involved in the administration of jus-
tice are drastically under-funded. 67 For example, the Guatemalan
Constitution mandates that the judiciary's budget may not be less
than two percent of the entire budget, 6 ' a percentage lower than that
allocated to physical education and sports.269 The Constitution gives
265. See Justice Quezada Interview, supra note 145.
266. Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, supra note 53, art. II.
267. See Ogdldez Interview, supra note 230; see also Coutifio Interview, supra
note 69.
268. See GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, art. 213.
269. See id. at art. 91 (allocating no less than three percent of the State's budget
to physical education and sports).
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Congress broad discretion to set the judiciary's budget, as is the case
in many countries. This broad discretion, however, is in the hands of
a Congress whose members may have a vested interest in preventing
the effective administration of justice because some of them may
have participated in the massacres.! , A strong commitment to in-
crease the judiciary's budget may not exist because this budgetary
power rests in the hands of people who may not want the judiciary to
adjudicate certain cases. Moreover, whatever the percentage allo-
cated to the judiciary, the total budget is limited by the inadequate
tax base and tax collection efforts."'
Substantial international aid has poured into Guatemala for the
purpose of strengthening the administration of justice.:2 International
donors have filled in the budgetary gaps to a certain extent with fi-
nancial and technical resources. For instance, the United States
Agency for International Development ("USAID") has instituted
several justice centers throughout Guatemala that seek to integrate all
of the resources necessary to the administration of justice."_7 Centers
that have benefited from this international aid have centralized re-
sources, computerized case management systems, trained intake and
investigation units in the local prosecutor's offices, and specially
270. See REMHI REPORT, supra note 1 at xxxiii (describing how impunity has
allowed those responsible for the violence to retain their positions of power and
privilege, thus influencing the conduct of the Army, police, military commissions,
and civil patrol, contributing to further violence against the people); see also Re-
port of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawylers, supra
note 76, at para. 141; supra Part IV.A and IV.B.2 (discussing how obstacles such
as corruption and lack of financial and technical resources hinder the fulfillment of
Guatemala's legal commitments).
271. See Hendrix Interview, supra note 214. USAID in Guatemala estimates that
only 6,000 people paid taxes last year. Id.
272. See Hendrix, supra note 11, at 413-18 (citing USAID as the principal donor
assisting the Guatemalan government to reform its justice system, but noting the
contributions of other donors such as MINUGUA, the Canadian, Dutch, and
Spanish governments, the Inter-American Development Bank. and the European
Union); see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence o) Judges
and Lauyers, supra note 76, at para. 78; Coutifio Interview. supra note 69.
273. See Steven E. Hendrix, Guatemalan "Justice Centers ": The Centerpiece
for Advancing Transparenqy Efficiency, Due Process. and Access to Justice, 15
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 813, 819-20 (2000) (outlining USAID initiatives that called
for not only training, but the creation of functionally integrated institutions and
procedures to gain support from the community and municipalities).
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trained court clerks.274 USAID considers the program a success as
measured by the difference between the number of cases lost by the
courts in Guatemala before the institution of the justice centers
(1,061) and the number lost after the justice centers (one). 2"
The effectiveness of the USAID program illustrates how addi-
tional resources can assist with the effective investigation and prose-
cution of the massacre cases. Unfortunately, courts and prosecutors'
offices outside of the city are suffering from a serious lack of finan-
cial and technical resources and still have the dismal "before" statis-
tics highlighted by USAID.276 For example, in Cobdn, the prosecu-
tor's office for Alta Verapaz has three prosecutors who each year
must collectively handle 6,000-7,000 violent crimes committed in
their office's jurisdiction, in addition to massacre cases for which in-
vestigations have begun in the last few years. 1 7 Although special
prosecutors are generally the most effective prosecutors, they also
are often overburdened.2 78 For example, Mario Leal, a special prose-
cutor, handles two high-impact cases with more than forty defen-
dants-the Dos Erres massacre case and the Gerardi case.2 Fur-
thermore, the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office has received the
same budget for the past four years and has had to rely on interna-
280tional money to function.
b. Coordination of Institutions and Resources
Some government actors and international donors suggest that the
institutions in the justice system have adequate funding.2 1' Rather
than inadequate funding, they suggest that the real problem is two-
274. Id. at 825.
275. Id. at 828.
276. See Hendrix Interview, supra note 214; see also Ramirez Interview, supra
note 67; Ogildez Interview, supra note 230.
277. See id.
278. Andrews Interview, supra note 91.
279. Id.; see also Interview with Lic. Mario Leal, Special Prosecutor in the Dos
Erres case, in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Leal Interview].
280. Aguilar Interview, supra note 76.
281. Hendrix Interview, supra note 214; see also Aguilar Interview, supra note
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fold: (1) the lack of coordination among institutions;"2 and (2) the in-
ability of institutions to absorb technical assistance.2"' As to the for-
mer, examples abound. For instance, prosecutors in the Ministerio
Pfiblico often have problems investigating because they lack techni-
cal, human, and financial resources. ' " The PNC could assist with
these investigations, but the communication between the two institu-
tions is so deficient that such cooperation rarely occurs.' Luis
Ramirez, Director of the Institute of Comparative Penal Studies of
Guatemala, stated that "the police should be under the lead of prose-
cutors, but this does not happen in practice."" This lack of coordi-
nation has hindered the progress of the massacre cases because their
investigations and ultimate prosecutions require cooperation among
the initial investigators on the cases, the prosecutor currently han-
dling the case, the PNC, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and other
institutions with relevant information or expertise.
In the Dos Erres massacre case, for example, a lack of communi-
cation between the prosecutor and the PNC led to significant de-
lays.287 The special prosecutor in the case stated that he requested a
detention order for several defendants from the judge on the case
282. Ferrigno Interview, supra note 191; see also Justice Barreda Interview, sit-
pra note 14; Aguilar Interview, supra note 76.
283. Hendrix Interview, supra note 214. MINUGUA has highlighted these
problems, stating,
[d]isparities have been noted in the capacity of national institutions to absorb
international cooperation and to use the technical assistance provided. This
means that the substantial effort made by one institution may be counteracted
by deficiencies in the functioning of another. This problem suggest that, at a
time of far-reaching institutional change, there is a need to create opportuni-
ties for dialogue and inter-institutional cooperation which are genuinely able
to overcome the compartmentalization of State responsibilities.
MINUGUA SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, §V, at para. 95.
284. See supra Part IV.B.4.a; see also Leal Interview, supra note 279 (discuss-
ing obstacles to the fulfillment of Guatemala's legal obligations).
285. See Mack Interview, supra note 14; see also Ramirez Interview, supra note
67.
286. Id.
287. Interview with Sara Romero, Assistant to Special Prosecutor Mano Leal, in
Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Romero Interview] (on file with
author).
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who sent it to the police chief.88 The prosecutor attempted several
times, to no avail, to have the police execute the order. The local po-
lice chief responded to those requests by saying that he did not have
any time to carry out the order.2 ' The police chief never executed the
order and ignored the prosecutor's repeated requests because no ef-
fective channel of communication between the PNC and the Ministe-
rio Piiblico existed. 290 The lack of systemic coordination between the
institutions has, therefore, allowed the defendants to remain free. 9'
The Guatemalan government has made efforts to address these
problems. The Peace Accords set up the Commission for the
Strengthening of Justice ("CSJ") to make recommendations for the
creation of a national policy on criminal justice that would affect all
institutions involved in the administration of justice. 92 The CSJ con-
sisted of representatives of the judiciary, the Ministerio Pdiblico, the
Interior Ministry, the deans of San Carlos Law Faculty and Rafael
291 hLandivar Law Faculty, the PNC, and two private citizens. Once the
CSJ fulfilled its mandate, it reconvened as the Ad Hoc Judicial
Strengthening Committee in order to implement the recommenda-
tions of the CSJ. 94 Following the inauguration of President Portillo,
this committee was again convened, this time as the National Com-
mission for the Strengthening of Justice ("NCSJ"). 29 1
Helen Mack, a member of the NCSJ has stated that however well
intentioned the NCSJ is, it has had only limited success.29 In addition
to trying to tackle the formidable structural problems in the criminal
justice system, the NCSJ has had trouble reaching consensus about
288. Leal Interview, supra note 279.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Romero Interview, supra note 287.
292. Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power, supra note 53, at pre-
amble, art. IV(15).
293. See id.; see also Justice Barreda Interview, supra note 14.
294. See Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power, supra note 53, at
preamble, art. IV(15).
295. See id.
296. See Mack Interview, supra note 14. Helen Mack was one of two individu-
als serving on the Committee and related the difficulties facing the Committee to
the delegation. See id.
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its initiatives.29 ' All but two of the members of the NCSJ are selected
from particular institutions and regard their role as representative of
their institutions' interests."' Many members claim that they need
approval from their institution before they can approve a proposal
within the NCSJ. 29 These tactics serve to stall progress in the NCSJ,
thus slowing down the reform process.
The second problem related to coordinating resources, the lack of
capacity to absorb resources, is illustrated by the example of the
Ministerio Piblico reportedly spending only seventy percent of its
entire budget last year.3"' The Ministerio Piblico could have used the
other thirty percent of its budget but apparently lacks the capacity to
deploy the resources, including the international technical assistance
it receives. The lack of absorptive capacity in the Ministerio Piiblico
is the result of inefficiency and the lack of a coordinated policy to
address crime in Guatemala.02
c. Recommendations
Guatemala's inadequate tax base and poor tax collection mecha-
nisms affect all institutions of government. Greater resources would
improve the functioning of all such institutions as long as those in-
stitutions can absorb those resources: °  With respect to the judiciary,
however, the budget should be fixed at a higher level to reduce po-
litical influence and adequately fund courts in both the city and the
countryside.
In addition to providing adequate funding, the State needs to coor-
dinate those funds and other resources in a timely manner so that
they can be deployed effectively to improve the criminal justice sys-
tem. Although the NCSJ may serve as a mechanism for coordinating





301. Ferrigno Interview, supra note 191.
302. Hendrix Interview, supra note 214.
303. Ferrigno Interview, supra note 191; see also Hendnx Interview, supra note
214.
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institutional entrenchment of its members must first be addressed.
Charging a well-functioning NCSJ with the administration of all in-
ternational aid would help eliminate waste and the problems related
to absorptive capacity. It would also assist in coordinating the State's
institutions.
With respect to the massacre cases, the problems of coordination
may best be dealt with by the establishment of a war crimes unit
within the Ministerio Pfiblico. The creation of such a unit would pro-
vide relief to local departmental prosecutors. This would be espe-
cially helpful for rural prosecutors who often lack both the resources
and technical capacity to prosecute those crimes. Members of the
war crimes unit would receive special training in both international
and domestic law governing such crimes. The unit would need its
own prosecutors, investigators, security personnel, and perhaps fo-
rensic experts, although forensic reports that conform to international
standards are already on file in many departmental court houses and
prosecutors' offices.3°4
5. The Inappropriate Classification of Military Secrets
Another way the State is failing to comply with its legal duty to
investigate and provide an effective remedy in the massacre cases in-
volves the definition of "military secrets." The military, including its
intelligence agencies, has used the excuse of protecting military se-
crets as a pretext to deny investigators basic information regarding
military units that operated near the sites of the massacres and that
may have been perpetrators of those human rights violations.9 As a
304. See Interview with Lic. Mariana Valdez6n, Founder of the Fundaci6n de
Antropologia Forense de Guatemala [Foundation for Forensic Anthropology of
Guatemala], and Director of the Equipo de Antropologia Forense de ]a ODHA [Fo-
rensic Anthropology Team of the ODHA], in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 20, 2000)
[hereinafter Valdez6n Interview] (on file with author). Lic. Valdez6n stated to the
delegation that due to the intensive training received in forensic anthropology by
different local archeologists conducting exhumations, nearly all the reports cur-
rently submitted comply with the Model Protocol for a Legal Investigation of Ex-
tra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions ("Minnesota Protocol"), promul-
gated by the U.N. Manual. See U.N. MANUAL, supra note 38 (emphasizing the
need for developing and adopting international standards for the investigation of
deaths in countries where extra-legal, arbitrary, and summary executions are al-
leged to have occurred).
305. See Interview with Lic. Alejandro Sinchez, Staff Attorney, Fundaci6n
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result, the investigations have regularly broken down before reaching
the culpable military personnel.?6 The military's definition of mili-
tary secrets does not appear to have any limits. It is not one that le-
gitimately can be defended as protecting military secrets while si-
multaneously adhering to the constitutional requirement that officials
be legally responsible for their official conduct." '
a. Military Culpability in the Massacre Cases
The CEH has determined that the army, either acting by itself or in
collaboration with other forces, was responsible for eighty-five per-
cent of all human rights violations and acts of violence registered in
the internal conflict!0  REMHI has determined that 422 massacres
took place during the internal conflict, with an estimated 14,000 vic-
tims.' 9 Reports implicate the Army in 90.52 percent of the massa-
cres,310 yet not a single commissioned military officer has ever been
indicted, let alone prosecuted for a role in the massacres."' The abuse
of the military secrets justification by the military and its intelligence
agencies is a significant reason for the continuation of impunity in
the massacre cases.12
Myrna Mack, in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Sinchez Interview]
(on file with author); see also Interview with Lic. Victor Moreira, Deputy Director
of the Secretaria de Anilisis Estrat~gico, in Guat. City, Guat. (Mar. 16, 2000)
[hereinafter Moreira Interview] (on file with author).
306. See Sd.nchez Interview, supra note 305.
307. See GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, art. 154 (providing that
"officials are depositories of authority, legally responsible for their official con-
duct, subject to the law and never above it.").
308. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, supra note 9, at 11.82.
309. See REMHI REPORT, supra note 1, at 134 (defining massacre as the "col-
lective murders associated with community destruction"). The total number of
murders, however, may be as high as 18,000 if the disappeared are also included.
See id.
310. See id (estimating that fifty-five percent of the military forces deemed re-
sponsible for the massacres acted alone).
311. See LaRue Interview, supra note 16.
312. See Moreira Interview, supra note 305; see also FUNDACION MYRNA
MACK, SECRETO DE ESTADO [STATE SECRET] 6 (Ariel Garrido ed. 1999).
2001] 1171
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
b. Lawmaking and Military Secrets
The Guatemalan Constitution requires that government records be
available to the public, except when the records involve military or
diplomatic matters concerning national security.3t3 The Constitution
does not define the parameters of national security matters, also re-
ferred to as "military secrets."'31 4 Although Congress has the authority
to define the term "military secrets" more precisely, it has not passed
a law on this matter to date.15 Instead, the Ministry of Defense and
the Departamento de Informacidn y Divulgaci6n del Ejercito
("DIDE"), the public information office of the Army, have tradition-
ally controlled the parameters of that term.3"6
In addition, Congress has not passed a law on declassification of
State-controlled information.3 ," Once classified as a military secret,
information may be shielded indefinitely. Declassification would al-
low the State to release basic information about past locations, func-
tions, and personnel of military units that is material to the prosecu-
tion of the massacre cases. At the present time, Guatemala does not
313. See GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at art. 30. According to
Colonel Douglas Barrera Guerra, the officer in charge of the Departamento de In-
formaci6n y Divulgaci6n del Ejercito ("DIDE") [Army Chief of Information and
Dissemination], the Army's public information office, the Army's policy is to re-
spond to requests for information by the Ministerio Pitblico within twenty-four
hours. See Interview with Colonel Douglas Barrera Guerra, in Guat. City, Guat.
(Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Col. Barrera Interview]. Colonel Barrera added that
the army destroys its files every ten years, so it no longer possesses information on
the massacre cases sought by the Ministerio Pfiblico. See id. Colonel Barrera also
noted that until recently the army did not maintain many written records. He sug-
gested that the oral tradition comes from the indigenous roots of the Army. See id.
314. See GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, art. 30. In a country un-
der a common law system, the Judicial branch as interpreter of the law would more
precisely define a general term in a constitution. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
276 (6th ed. 1990). Under Guatemala's civil law system, however, Congress rather
than the Judicial branch has this authority. See Roberto G. MacLean, Judicial Dis-
cretion in the Civil Law, 43 LA. L. REv. 45, 45-46 (1982).
315. See Mack Interview, supra note 14 (suggesting the judiciary should control
the definition of military secrets).
316. See id.; see also FUNDACION MYRNA MACK, supra note 312, at 10-11. Ac-
cording to Col. Barrera, however, each ministry sets its own policy as to what con-
stitutes a military secret. See Col. Barrera Interview, supra note 313.
317. See FUNDACION MYRNA MACK, supra note 312, at 24-25.
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have a declassification policy of any kind."'
This lack of legal definition of "military secrets," as well as the
lack of a declassification policy, has had an important impact on the
prosecution of the massacre and other cases. For instance, the De-
fense Ministry, and in particular the Estado Mayor Presidencial
("EMP"), the State security apparatus, ' used protection of military
secrets as an excuse not to provide information in the Myrna Mack
murder case.320 In the investigation into the EMP superiors who al-
legedly ordered the killing, the prosecution asked the military for ba-
sic information such as vehicle and events logs of the EMP.':' The
military withheld the information on the grounds that it constituted
military secrets, 3" and the Judicial branch refused to compel the
military to cooperate. 3" Due to this and other obstructions of justice
the Ministerio Pfiblico has been unable to successfully prosecute the
intellectual authors of the Mack murder. 12
At other times, the military has simply refused to respond to re-
quests for information without formally invoking the military secrets
pretext. For example, in the Cuarto Pueblo case a prosecutor wrote to
the Defense Ministry seeking basic information about military per-
sonnel at a military base in the area where military helicopters alleg-
edly participated in a massacre of approximately 300 people.'2' The
Defense Ministry reportedly stonewalled the prosecutor's repeated
requests for information before finally responding that the military
318. See Moreira Interview, supra note 305.
319. See REMHI REPORT, supra note 1, at 105, 107-08 (discussing the Army's
control of the Estado Mayor Presidencial ("EMP"), the State security apparatus).
320. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 87, § 2, at 5-6
(discussing Helen Mack's failed attempts to gain access to shielded information,
upheld by domestic courts as military secrets).
321. Id. at 6.
322. See id. (discussing the need for information in understanding the EMP's
organizational structure and practices).
323. See id. (reviewing the judicial authority under the Criminal Procedure Code
to review documents in camera to determine validity of military secret assertions
but failure of judiciary to make such inquiries).
324. See id. (reporting the inability to gain redress in domestic forum).
325. See Ogdldez Interview, supra note 230.
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base did not exist at the time of the massacre."'
c. The Role of Judges and Prosecutors
An additional problem related to the classification of military se-
crets involves judges' failure to exercise their power to review mili-
tary secrets in confidence. Under the Guatemalan Constitution, all
State organizations must provide judges the assistance they need to
carry out justice. Furthermore, the CPP authorizes a presiding
judge to review in confidence records withheld on grounds of mili-
tary secrecy and to decide if such withholding is appropriate." 8 A
judge may also place the records in the court file on a confidential
basis in order to make use of the information in the trial." 9
In theory, this judicial authority provides a check on the expansive
definition of military secrets. Nevertheless, although judges have
such authority in relation to the military, they often do not employ it
because they fear retaliation from military personnel. " In the Myrna
Mack Case, the Judicial branch did not compel submission of the
EMP records even though this method of confidential review was
available. 31 This may be due to the intimidation of judges in cases
involving military personnel. For instance, the judge in Cubulco,
Baja Verapaz was kidnapped for a day, apparently in order to pres-
sure him to be lenient with the military and PAC perpetrators of the
Rio Negro and Plan de Sdnchez massacres.332
Prosecutors may also be reluctant to aggressively seek information
from the military regarding ostensible military secrets. For example,
one special prosecutor who subpoenaed high-ranking military per-
sonnel to testify in the Dos Erres massacre case subsequently lost his
job when the Attorney General refused to renew his appointment.'"
326. See id.
327. GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, art. 203.
328. CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 48, art. 244.
329. See id.
330. See Justice Barreda Interview, supra note 14; see also Mack Interview, su-
pra note 14.
331. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 87, § 2, at 6.
332. See Men6ndez Interview, supra note 89.
333. See M&1gar Telephone Interview, supra note 111; see also Farfdn Inter-
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d. Recommendations
The State can address its failure to comply with its legal duty un-
der international and domestic law to provide timely justice in the
massacre cases by defining the parameters of "military secrets.""' In
compliance with the Peace Accords, Congress should pass a statute
clearly defining that term. 3"' By doing so, the State can also meet its
obligation under Article 203 of the Constitution, which requires State
organizations to provide the judiciary with the assistance it needs to
do its job.336 Defining military secrets, combined with adhering to the
CPP Article 244 provision permitting confidential review of military
documents by a judge, will allow the State to appropriately balance
national security concerns with its obligation to provide justice.
The president must fulfill his or her constitutional mandate to exe-
cute any law passed by Congress "7 and ensure that the Defense Min-
istry, including the military, obeys it. The president has further
authority to ensure compliance through his or her role as supreme
commander of the armed forces.'" Once the Defense Ministry, in-
cluding the EMP, has clear instructions on what constitutes a military
secret, it will be obliged to turn over non-secret material information
concerning specific massacre cases to the Judicial branch. That in-
formation will then be available in open court or to the judge in con-
fidence, depending on the nature of it.
The State can also address its failure to comply with its legal duty
under international and domestic law to provide timely justice in the
massacre cases by enacting legislation on declassification of State-
controlled information. The Peace Accords call on Congress to carry
out this task.339 A declassification policy would help make material
view, supra note 112.
334. See Mack Interview, supra note 14; see also FUNDACION MYRNA MACK,
supra note 312, at 24-25.
335. See also Agreement on the Strengthening of Civihan Power, supra note 53,
at IV.E.52(b) (stating need for a law regulating the classification, declassification,
and access to military information).
336. GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, art. 203.
337. Id. art. 183(a); see also id. art. 183(e) (requiring the President to "approve,
promulgate, execute, and cause the execution of the laws").
338. Id. art. 183(c).
339. See Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power, supra note 53, at
2001] 1175
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
information available to the victims and their families in massacre
cases. 4 It would allow the State to release basic information about
past locations, functions, and personnel of military units, for exam-
ple, that is material to the prosecution of the massacre cases.
The Secretaria de Analisis Estrategico ("SAE"), the Secretariat of
Strategic Analysis for the Office of the President, the recently re-
structured civilian intelligence service, is working on a definition of
military secret and a policy for declassification.141 SAE Deputy Di-
rector Victor Moreira noted, however, that those policies will only
govern the activities of the SAE.142 The Ministry of Defense, includ-
ing the military and intelligence agencies, reportedly possess infor-
mation vital to the prosecution of the massacre cases and should be
required to adopt commensurate policies to ensure that information is
available to the prosecutors.343
6. Misuse and Failure to Utilize Procedural Mechanisms
Through the misuse of, and failure to utilize, legal procedural
mechanisms, the State further fails to comply with its legal duty to
investigate and provide an effective remedy in the massacre cases.
The Ministerio Paiblico and members of the judiciary appear to mis-
use several procedural tools to significantly delay or deter the inves-
tigations and prosecutions of those responsible for the massacres.
They misuse procedure through formalism-using the pretense of
applying laws and procedures to ultimately undermine the effective
prosecution of massacre cases. 44 For victims and their families, this
formalism prevents effective use of the system by creating impedi-
ments in filing cases and pursuing investigations in massacre cases."5
111.8-11.
340. See Moreira Interview, supra note 305.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See DOS REPORT, supra note 4, at 772 (detailing existence of the "military
diary," an alleged military intelligence dossier recording the military's abduction,
torture, and killing of Guatemalans during the period 1983-1985).
344. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, supra note 76, at para. 48.
345. See Interview with Lic. Nery Rodenas, Coordinator of ODHA, in Guat.
City, Guat. (Mar. 16, 2000).
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Although the strict adherence to these procedures creates the appear-
ance of conformity with the law, the way in which the procedures are
applied prevents the timely administration of justice.
This adherence to formalism contributes to extensive delay in the
justice system. It may take years from the filing of the complaint to
the beginning of the investigation and exhumation procedure.' In
the Rio Negro case, five years elapsed from the filing of the com-
plaint to the beginning of the exhumation, and an additional five
years went by before the beginning of the trial.-' The Pichec massa-
cre case only recently began the exhumation phase, over five years
after the complaint was filed, and a trial is not likely to begin in the
near future." 8 These cases, like most of the massacre cases, come
from incidents that occurred in the mid-1980s, meaning that the in-
vestigations were begun at least a decade after the killings.' Both
Rio Negro and Pichec are examples of investigations that began after
a victim or witness filed a complaint, but complaints have not been
filed in most cases. Despite knowledge and evidence of past crimes,
the Ministerio Pfiblico has failed to accept its responsibility to inves-
tigate cases and pursue investigations where they have not received
specific complaints.
a. Failure to Efficiently Process Amparo Challenges
Some of the delay in massacre cases is attributable to the use of
the aniparo, a special appeal that defendants can raise at any time
during the case.350 These appeals must be based on constitutional
grounds, and serve to protect the constitutional rights of the defen-
dant."' The defendant may file the amparo at any time during the
346. See de Leon Interview, supra note 195.
347. See Rio Negro case file (on file with Crowley International Human Rights
Program, Fordham University School of Law).
348. See Pichec case file (on file with Crowley international Human Rights Pro-
gram, Fordham University School of Law).
349. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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trial to challenge the constitutionality of a trial court's decision. "2 It
is heard by the Court of Appeals, and may be appealed further to the
Supreme Court, and then to the Court of Constitutionality." ' While
the amparo provides an important protection for defendants' consti-
tutional rights, the process is very time consuming. Since the amparo
must be resolved before the case can proceed, its misuse is criticized
as one method by which defendants may slow their proceedings and
delay final justice.354
The method by which the courts handle amparo challenges is
lengthy, adding significant delays during trial. 5 Because the amparo
proceeding may be raised at any time during trial or appeal, these
delays compound the frustration of timely justice."6
b. Identification of Victims
Another source of delay in the massacre cases is the Ministerio
PfNblico's insistence on identifying victims before investigating or
prosecuting massacre cases.35' The Ministerio Pfiblico reportedly
lacks the technical resources and training to identify victims itself." '
In addition to a lack of resources for identifying victims, the Ministe-
rio Pfiblico faces difficulty in identifying victims because of a lack of
medical records and DNA testing capability.35 Despite the difficulty
in identifying victims, some prosecutors will only pursue an investi-
gation if the victims have been positively identified."
Lic. Mynor Elis~o Ogdldez, the District Attorney in Alta Verapaz
responsible for the prosecution of the Cuarto Pueblo massacre, high-
lighted this reluctance to prosecute without positive identification of
352. See M6lgar Telephone Interview, supra note 111.
353. Id.
354. See MINUGUA SIXTH REPORT, supra note 20, § IV, para. 70.
355. See id. (criticizing judges for allowing remedies that inevitably delay pro-
ceedings).
356. See id.
357. See Meurth Interview, supra note 191.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See Ogildez Interview, supra note 230.
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victims.16 ' The identification of the bodies of Cuarto Pueblo massacre
victims is difficult because the perpetrators burned the bodies beyond
recognition. According to Lic. Ogdldez, he cannot prosecute the
Cuarto Pueblo massacre without identification of the victims.2 He
stated, "Guatemala... civil registrations records ... legally prove a
person's status [as dead or alive]. Because no one killed in the
Cuarto Pueblo massacre was identified, they are all still legally
alive." '363 Lic. Ogdldez asserted that he did not bother to pursue the
investigation because the courts would not accept a prosecution for a
murder of person who is still legally alive.3M Other prosecutors, like
Lic. Ogdldez, use this reasoning when explaining to victims and their
advocates why massacre cases have not proceeded. W
Prosecutors have not pursued cases in which as many as 1,000
bodies were found in a mass grave if those bodies could not be posi-
tively identified, even when overwhelming evidence from other
sources, including eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence sup-
ports the murder charge."'6 For example, in the Rio Negro case the
defendants were convicted of murdering only two people because
those two victims were the only two out of the 250 victims of the
massacre who were identified. No one was convicted of the other
murders. 67
Identification is a lengthy process, and the Ministerio Pfiblico has
insufficient resources for that process."" Thus, the formalistic insis-
tence on identifying victims despite overwhelming evidence of mas-
sacres impedes progress in the massacre cases, and is unnecessary in
light of the other evidence available to the Ministerio Pfiblico. Con-
361. See supra Part IV.B.3; see also Meurth Interview, supra note 191.
362. See Og~ldez Interview, supra note 230.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See Seils Interview, supra note 2; see also Minem Interview, supra note
170; Meurth Interview, supra note 191.
366. See M~nem Interview, supra note 170.
367. See Rio Negro case file (on file with Crowley International Human Rights
Program, Fordham University School of Law).
368. See supra Part III.B.4.b (explaining how inadequacy of financial and tech-
nical resources impedes proper prosecution and remedies); see also Meurth Inter-
view, supra note 191.
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tinued insistence on identification before proceeding with investiga-
tion and prosecution, if sufficient additional evidence exists, violates
the right to an effective remedy provided for under international
law.369
c. Certification of Conviction
The requirement of a certification of conviction from the Execu-
tion of Sentence Court, the court that oversees the final step in a con-
viction, is another opportunity for delay after a conviction is ob-
tained. The certification of conviction is issued by the Execution of
Sentence Court as the final procedure before a guilty party is incar-
cerated.37° While the certification of conviction does not impede the
prosecution of a defendant, prosecutors sometimes delay prosecution
of other defendants until the court certifies the sentence of the first
defendant. This poses a particular problem in the massacre cases; the
delay from the initial charge to final judgment can be many years,
during which time witnesses and other evidence may become un-
available.
A case is turned over to the Execution of Sentence Court only
when the appeals process is exhausted. 7' This court does not impose
a sentence, but supervises the sentence of the trial court. The Execu-
tion of Sentence Court enforces the correct length of sentence and
handles complaints about prison conditions.3 While the supervision
of the sentence is an important protection for the defendant, the ac-
tual imposition of the sentence by the Execution of Sentence Court is
a mere formality since the sentence has already been imposed by the
trial or appeals court.
3 73
The Rio Negro case provides an example of how prosecutors may
have misused the certification process. Many of the defendants who
were named in the initial complaint are still in the military and could
be easily found. Despite obtaining three convictions in that case, the
369. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the various international treaties that re-
quire Guatemala to provide adequate remedies for violations of the right to life).






prosecutor has not proceeded against other defendants, claiming that
a certification of conviction must first be obtained from the Execu-
tion of Sentence Court.3 1 4 In fact, the CPP does not require certifica-
tion of conviction before other defendants can be prosecuted." By
incorrectly suggesting that further prosecutions cannot take place
until all the appeals have been exhausted and the sentence has been
certified, the courts are further delaying the prosecution of the
higher-level participants. This continued impunity constitutes the
State's failure to comply with its legal obligations. If this practice of
requiring a certification of conviction continues, the likelihood of
obtaining high-level convictions of those responsible for the massa-
cres will be further diminished.3 '7
d. Plea bargaining
Plea bargaining represents a potentially useful procedural tool for
obtaining convictions in massacre cases. But prosecutors have used
plea bargaining in only one of the massacre cases to date,3- and have
failed to bring the intellectual authors of massacres to justice. By
failing to use plea bargains, prosecutors forfeit an important opportu-
nity to secure cooperation agreements of low-level actors that would
allow the use of testimony essential for convictions of high-level
perpetrators and intellectual authors.
Part of the reluctance to use plea bargaining may result from the
historical prohibition on the practice. ' Plea bargaining was not con-
templated under the former penal procedure code. The code was re-
vised in 1994 to permit plea bargaining in some cases." ' Despite the
change in law, however, there has not been any significant plea bar-
gaining in massacre cases.""'
Article 25 of the CPP outlines the situations in which plea bar-
374. See T6cu Interview, supra note 98.
375. See generally CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 48.
376. See T6cu Interview, supra note 98.
377. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also intr notes 386-394
and accompanying text.
378. See Men6ndez Interview, supra note 89.
379. See C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 48, art. 25.
380. See S.nchez Interview, supra note 305.
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gaining may be used."' While it does prohibit plea bargaining in
some situations for certain defendants, it does not categorically pro-
hibit the practice.382 Because Guatemala lacks any national legal
doctrine on plea bargaining,"' prosecutors sometimes intentionally
narrowly interpret Article 25 of the CPP to avoid plea bargaining to
secure the convictions of high-level military perpetrators or intellec-
tual authors. 84 For prosecutors who are the targets of intimidation or
corruption, or for those who simply lack the political will, the claim
that plea bargaining is not available provides a convenient excuse for
not prosecuting those responsible for the massacres.385
The first plea bargaining agreement in a massacre case occurred in
the year 2000 with the Dos Erres case in the department of Peten." 6
Two Kaibiles, non-commissioned special-forces soldiers, who alleg-
edly guarded the perimeter for the military unit involved but did not
directly participate in the killings, offered their testimony in return
for asylum.387 On March 17, 2000, the two former soldiers testified in
a closed hearing before the Judge of the First Instance of San Benito,
Peten."' In the presence of the judge, the special prosecutor, the
plaintiffs prosecutor, and a public defender, they provided detailed
testimony of the massacre and its participants.'"
Each witness gave his uninterrupted testimony and was then ques-
381. See CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 48, art. 25.
382. See id.
383. See Hendrix, supra note 11, at 400 (asserting that Guatemala lacks legal
doctrine, case law or Latin American comparative law on plea bargains).
384. See M6lgar Telephone Interview, supra note 111.
385. Id.
386. See generally Leal Interview, supra note 279.
387. Id.
388. See Dos Erres Witness Interview, supra note 139.
389. See Leal Interview, supra note 279. Under Article 348 in the CPP,. in spe-
cial circumstances anticipatory evidence can be provided in a pre-trial hearing. See
CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 48, art. 348. This procedure is usually re-
served for circumstances where the witness is unable to attend the trial. In the case
of Dos Erres, however, the witnesses believed their lives would be in danger if
they testified during the actual trial. The prosecutor admitted that it would be diffi-
cult to guarantee the safety for them and their families and thus requested the an-
ticipatory evidence hearing. See Leal Interview, supra note 279.
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tioned by the prosecutor, private prosecutor, and public defender.'
The witnesses named defendants, both soldiers and commissioned
officers, as participants in the killings. ' As a consequence of this
"anticipatory evidence," the prosecutor requested, and the judge is-
sued, arrest warrants. Currently, the PCN is in the process of exe-
cuting these warrants.392
Plea bargaining in massacre cases is controversial. Some victims
groups oppose offering leniency to anyone involved with such
atrocities.9 Reportedly, however, many victims feel that the true tar-
get of prosecutions should be the intellectual authors and the com-
manders who carried out the orders, and that lesser sentences for
rank-and-file soldiers and civil patrollers would be an acceptable
trade-off." ' The plea bargaining in the Dos Erres case serves as an
example of the potential benefits of such a compromise.
e. Recommendations
An effective criminal policy adopted by the State would help ad-
dress the specific problems highlighted above, and the endemic
problems within the system. The adherence to formalism in the jus-
tice system that impedes effective resolution of the massacre is the
result of a failure to address the systematic problems through execu-
tive attention. The State must establish effective policies that address
the delays in the system, and make those policies clear to every level
of the criminal justice system.
In order to address the significant delays in the massacre prosecu-
tions, Guatemala must increase the efficiency of the court process.
One possible solution is to definitively include massacre cases in the
jurisdiction of the regional courts recently established to deal with
high-level crimes and narcotics trafficking. Jurisdiction alone is not
390. See Dos Erres Witness Interview, supra note 139. The public defender's
participation is required to protect as much as possible the rights of the potential
defendants who might be named during the hearing. See Leal Interview, supra note
279.
391. See Dos Erres Witness Interview, supra note 139.
392. See Leal Interview, supra note 279.
393. See Interview with Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo ("GAM"), in Guat. City (Mar.
17, 2000) [hereinafter GAM Interview] (on file with author).
394. See T6cu Interview, supra note 98.
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enough, however. The judges and prosecutors in these courts should
be given special training on the law specific to massacre cases and on
methods for handling complex cases.
Although the amparo is an important protection for defendants,
and is protected by the Constitution, the use of the amparo by defen-
dants slows down the legal system, which impedes timely resolution
of the massacre cases. The procedure governing amparo appeals
should be re-evaluated in light of the significant delays it causes in
the judicial process. The process should be streamlined to facilitate
the timely resolution of spurious constitutional challenges.
In massacre cases, the Ministerio Piblico should initiate prosecu-
tions where there is sufficient evidence of a crime committed, even
when the victims have not been identified. The adherence to formal-
ism concerning identification is unnecessary in light of the other evi-
dence available to the Ministerio Pfiblico. Although not necessary for
prosecution, the Ministerio Piblico should commit more resources to
forensic investigations to ensure identification of the victims both to
speed prosecutions and to provide truth for the victims.
The Attorney General should formally issue guidelines to his or
her prosecutors explaining the legality of pursuing subsequent defen-
dants prior to obtaining a certification of conviction for the initial de-
fendants.3 95 Furthermore, the Attorney General should explicitly in-
form prosecutors that this policy applies to all crimes, including
massacre cases. Local prosecutors should pursue the investigation
and prosecution of every person named in a complaint, as required
by law.
Finally, plea bargaining should be used as a tool in the prosecution
of other massacre cases, as it was in the Dos Erres massacre case.
The Ministerio Pfiblico should use plea bargains to the extent that
they are offered to secure convictions of those ultimately responsible
for these crimes, the practice should be pursued by the Ministerio
Pfiblico generally, and in particular by those local prosecutors who
have the opportunity to get valuable testimony through cooperation
395. See Ley Orgdnica del Ministerio Pfiblico, Decreto Nimero 40-94, passed
May 2, 1994, amended by Decreto Niimero 135-97, passed Dec. 10, 1997, art. I 1
(providing the Attorney General with the ability to issue guidelines to all prosecu-
tors and other officials under his authority).
1184 [16:1115
L2IPUITYIX Gu -ITEfAL.I
agreements. The Ministerio Piiblico should develop specific plea
bargaining policies for local prosecutors, clarifying both the legality
of the practice under Article 25 of the CPP, and specifying which
cases should make use of the practice to facilitate the conviction of
the highest-level perpetrators.
IV. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS OBSTACLES TO JUSTICE
This report identifies six specific obstacles that prevent the State
from providing timely justice in the massacre cases: intimidation;
corruption; incompetence; resource managementflack of resources;
the lack of a definition for the term "military secrets;" and the misuse
and failure to utilize procedural mechanisms. While the obstacles
have been categorized as separate and mutually exclusive problems,
in reality they overlap and interact with each other in a variety of
ways.
1. Intimidation
The Ministerio Pdiblico should address intimidation of judicial
actors by providing better security to them as required under the
Protection of Judicial Actors Law. The Ministerio Pfiblico claims
that this decree has not been implemented due to lack of funding. It
is the responsibility of the Ministerio Piiblico to implement the pro-
grams and request funds from Congress.
- The Executive and Legislative branches should support protec-
tion of judicial actors by fully funding the Protection of Judicial Ac-
tors Law. International funding for this program would help reduce
these threats and intimidation.
o The judiciary should complement these steps by implementing
its own security initiatives to ensure the safety of judicial actors.
- The Ministerio Piiblico should assume an aggressive policy of
investigation and prosecution of those who threaten judicial actors.
2. Corruption
o The State should establish an independent body with investiga-
tive and prosecutorial powers to address corruption within the legal
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system. That office should be empowered to take complaints directly
from the public, and should include representation from civil society
through private individuals or NGOs. Reports from this office should
be public to ensure transparency.
o The Ministerio Piblico should confront corruption with vigorous
investigation and prosecution. Otherwise, corruption will only con-
tinue to expand.
o The judiciary should implement strong internal review proce-
dures for judges who abuse their positions.
o The State should undertake initiatives to diminish the influence
of military personnel in the judiciary and the Ministerio Pfiblico who
may have been involved in the massacres. The State should remove
those former military actors who are not carrying out the functions of
their office, or who are using their influence to affect the judicial
process.
o The State should provide better protection for judges and prose-
cutors, and increased salaries, to ensure that the effects of corruption
are minimized.
o Longer terms for judges should be provided in order to reduce or
eliminate undue political influence.
3. Incompetence
o To address the problem of insufficient legal education, the Gua-
temalan Bar Association and the State should collaborate to mod-
ernize and standardize legal education, including graduation re-
quirements. The recommendations to expand law school curricula
put forth by the NCSJ, and adopted by the Universities of San Carlos
and Rafael Landivar, should be extended to the other law faculties.
o To address the problem of incompetence in the judiciary, the Ju-
dicial branch should require additional education for all current
judges analogous to that required in the school for new judges.
o A similar training program should be initiated for prosecutors.
Training should focus on both investigative duties and courtroom re-
sponsibilities.
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4. Resource Management and Coordination/Lack of Resources
0 The State should increase its tax base and implement more ef-
fective enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with tax col-
lection. Without additional money, the State will be constrained from
implementing sustained reform in the justice system.
* The budgets of both the Ministerio Piblico and the judiciary
should be increased so they can effectively handle their current
caseload, in addition to massacre cases that may reach the courts in
the future.
o The State should implement a comprehensive criminal policy to
help target the areas in the system most in need of additional re-
sources and address the problems of coordination of resources and
absorptive capacity. The current NCSJ, previously discussed in rela-
tion to the need for a national criminal policy, is well-positioned to
develop this policy, and should be given the mandate to do so.
o The Ministerio Pfiblico should establish a well-trained and fully
funded war crimes unit to handle massacre cases. This unit would
allow the prosecutors to more effectively investigate and prosecute
the massacre cases.
5. Definition of Military Secrets and Declassification
o Congress should develop a law defining "military secrets" in or-
der to facilitate access to material information that the military pos-
sesses about the massacres.
o The President must then execute such a law enacted by Congress
and ensure that the Defense Ministry, including the military, obeys it.
o The judiciary should exert its powers under Article 244 of the
CPP, which allows the court to conduct confidential reviews of sen-
sitive materials. This would make material evidence available in the
massacre cases, while recognizing national security concerns.
- A declassification procedure should be established by law to fa-
cilitate efforts by judicial actors to obtain information from the State
in general and the Ministry of Defense specifically. This would be
particularly useful in efforts to establish intellectual authorship in the
massacre cases. That law should include procedures that allow pri-
vate citizens to access that information.
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o The Ministry of Defense should be required to adopt the SAE
declassification policies to ensure that military information is avail-
able to the prosecutors.
6. Misuse and Failure to Utilize Procedural Mechanisms
* The State should adopt a comprehensive criminal policy to en-
sure effective and efficient prosecution of the massacre cases.
• The Ministerio Piblico should carry out its responsibility to ini-
tiate investigations and prosecute the massacre cases. The Ministerio
Pfiblico should correct the institutional tendency to wait for victims
to initiate prosecutions and, instead, initiate investigations itself.
* While the process of amparo is an important constitutional pro-
tection, the mechanism for handling amparo appeals should be
streamlined, so that the constitutional challenges do not derail timely
justice.
o The judiciary should make clear that the massacre cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the proposed special narcotics and high-
level crimes courts.
o To the extent that plea bargains are offered to secure convictions
of the intellectual authors of the massacres, plea bargains should be
pursued by the Ministerio Pfiblico. In particular, local prosecutors
who have the opportunity to get valuable testimony through coop-
eration agreements should use this important tool.
B. CONCLUSION
Under international and domestic law, Guatemala has an obliga-
tion to investigate and provide an effective remedy in the massacre
cases. The State has failed to comply with that duty largely because
of the six obstacles to justice described above. The recommendations
discussed in this Report cannot be effective, however, unless the
State develops the political will to provide timely justice in the mas-
sacre cases. New developments in Guatemala have the potential to
advance the massacre cases, but their success in doing so still re-
mains to be seen.
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V. PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD AFFECT
PROSECUTION OF THE MASSACRE CASES
Upon assuming office in January 2000, President Alfonso Portillo
announced a number of initiatives that could have important ramifi-
cations for the future resolution of the massacre cases. A significant
portion of his inaugural address focused on human rights.' President
Portillo stated in his address that the Peace Accords are "State trea-
ties." '397 This designation clarifies that the Accords are a contract be-
tween the State and the guerrillas, rather than only between the pre-
vious administration that signed them and the guerrillas.
President Portillo also promised to implement the recommenda-
tions of the CEH Truth Commission, including the establishment of a
Peace and Harmony Foundation.39' The Foundation would oversee
the implementation of the CEH recommendations. One year later,
due in part to opposition from Congress, this foundation still had not
been established.399 In his speech, the President also observed that in
Guatemala, "a climate of structural impunity persists," and that his
government was committed to the "construction of a national justice
system and the implementation of a consensual State criminal pol-
icy."'' M The President also announced that he would immediately ini-
tiate an investigation regarding the alleged role of state agents in the
assassination of Bishop Juan Gerardi.4"
Even though the Ministerio Ptlblico is largely institutionally inde-
pendent of the Executive branch, shortly after President Portillo's in-
augural speech, various arrests were made in the Gerardi case, in-
cluding that of two military officers. " 2 This could indicate that the
396. See Portillo's Inaugural Address, supra note 56.
397. Id. at 10.
398. Id. at 13.
399. See Telephone Interview with Carmen Aida Ibarra, Myrna Mack Founda-
tion, in Guat. City, Guat. (Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with author).
400. Portillo Inaugural Address, supra note 56, at 14.
401. See id. at 10.
402. See Elder Interiano et al., Tres capturados por asesinato tie rnonseior
Girardi [Three Captured in the Murder of Monseizor Girardi]. PRENSA LIBRE, Jan.
22, 2000 (on file with the authors) (reporting on the impact of these arrests after it
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President's commitment to human rights had effects on the justice
system. As of January 2001, according to COPREDEH, the trial of
the two military officers was scheduled for late February.0 3
President Portillo made these commitments on other occasions as
well, including during a private meeting with human rights NGOs in
Washington, D.C. prior to his election, where he invited the human
rights community to visit Guatemala and hold him accountable to
these commitments.'O' International human rights NGOs and foreign
governments should accept President Portillo's invitation by sending
delegations to further examine the progress of the massacre prosecu-
tions. The domestic and international attention generated by visits to
Guatemala could pressure its government to advance the massacre
cases. This could also provide support for the judicial actors involved
in the proceedings.
On March 3, 2000, Guatemala presented its offer of the friendly
settlement at the IACHR.4 "' As discussed earlier, the offer contained
three basic components: (1) an admission of State culpability; (2) a
commitment to support domestic criminal proceedings against those
responsible; and (3) an offer to negotiate reparations with family
members of the victims. 4°6 While the friendly settlement should be
commended, it remains little more than a symbolic gesture until it
bears fruit. Because neither the Ministerio Pu'blico nor the judiciary
signed the agreement,4 7 they are arguably not directly bound by it.'0
Even so, one Guatemalan human rights activist suggested that this
international civil settlement might have positive effects on the do-
mestic criminal prosecution of massacre cases. °  With respect to the
was believed that the investigation had come to a standstill).
403. Letter from Victor Hugo God6y, President, COPREDEH (Feb. 1, 200 1) (on
file with the American University International Law Review).
404. See Interview with Alfredo Forti, Advisor to President Portillo, Guat. City,
Guat. (Jan 17, 2000) (on file with author).
405. See Andres Oppenheimer, Surprise: Praise for Guatemala, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 30, 2000, at 10A (reporting that the IACHR characterized the offer
as "an example for the hemisphere").
406. See Farfdn Interview, supra note 112.
407. See God6y Interview, supra note 64.
408. Id.
409. See Farfin Interview, supra note 112.
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Dos Erres massacre, some of the government's commitments under
the friendly settlement were fulfilled as of December 2000. The gov-
ernment reiterated the State's responsibility,"" and a commission was
established to identify and compensate the victims of the massacre."
Unfortunately, the most important procedural advances have yet to
occur, since the arrest warrants were issued in March 2000."2
Strong Executive branch support for the criminal proceedings
could provide added impetus to resolve the massacre cases. In Gua-
temala, as in all democracies, constitutionally mandated separation of
powers exists among the different branches of government,"' but
determined political will in the Executive branch reverberates
throughout other branches of government. The president also has
substantial influence over the various components of the State
through the power to appoint and remove officials, and influence
over budgetary matters.'"
As mentioned by the human rights organization FAMDEGUA, the
friendly settlement presents both an opportunity and a challenge for
Guatemalan human rights organizations." 5 Attention and publicity
generated around the friendly settlement could have a positive im-
pact on the massacre cases. While the CEH and REMHI reports re-
ceived widespread public attention, neither report was an official
admission of State culpability for the many massacres for which the
State was held responsible. The admission of State responsibility
could spark an increase in public interest and support for domestic
prosecution of the massacre cases.
Domestic prosecutions may also move ahead due to the scheduled
410. See Informe General del Gobierno de Guatemala en Relaci6n al Caso
C.I.D.H. 11.681 Aldfa Las Dos Erres, [Guatemalan Government General Report
Regarding the C.I.D.H. Las Dos Erres case 11.681], COPREDEH (2000).
411. See id.
412. See id.
413. See GUATEMALAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, arts. 157, 183 (estab-
lishing the functions of the Executive and Legislative branches of the Guatemalan
government).
414. See id. art. 183(j) (providing that the President shall annually submit a
budget to Congress for "expenditures of the State").
415. See generally Farfdn Interview, supra note 112.
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initiation of two regional tribunals this year,"6 one each for the west-
ern and eastern regions of Guatemala.1 7 These regional tribunals will
adjudicate cases involving murder, kidnapping, drug trafficking, rob-
bery, and car theft.48 It is unclear, however, whether the jurisdiction
of the regional tribunals will extend to the massacre cases.4 '9 Justice
Napoleon Gutierrez of Guatemala's Supreme Court of Justice stated
that he is not sure whether the tribunals could adjudicate massacre
cases, while the President of the Supreme Court stated that the tribu-
nals would have jurisdiction over those cases. 20
The regional tribunals will have safeguards to deal with at least
four of the obstacles to justice in the massacre cases. First, the United
States Embassy in Guatemala will assist the State with security
measures for the protection of judicial actors; this should decrease
threats.421 Second, corruption and incompetence should be less of a
problem because the judges, prosecutors, and their staffs will be
carefully selected based on their past performance and integrity.2
Third, the regional tribunals will have better technical resources than
other prosecutorial offices and courts because they will be central-
ized and coordinated. 43 Fourth, more financial resources will go to
training and increased salaries.424 Thus, if the regional tribunals do in
fact have jurisdiction over the massacre cases, and if they function
according to their mandate, they are likely to be more effective in
adjudicating massacre cases than courts of the first instance have
been.
Another initiative under the new government that could contribute
to the advancement of the massacre cases is the dismantling of the
416. See Justice Guti~rrez Interview, supra note 167.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.; see also Quezada Interview, supra note 145 (reporting that the Presi-
dent of the Supreme Court of Justice stated that these tribunals would have juris-
diction over massacre cases).
420. Quezada Interview, supra note 145.
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EMP and the Presidential General Staff, and the restructuring of the
SAE.42 ' The EMP has long been regarded as the center of clandestine
military intelligence and operations.2 By restructuring and demilita-
rizing the SAE, President Portillo proposes to establish something
similar to a National Security Council-an institution that will pro-
vide the president with strategic analysis on major issues affecting
govemability.4" This distinguishes the restructured SAE from the
former EMP, which often ordered, as opposed to advised, the presi-
dent.4
28
The other primary objective of this initiative is to dismantle the in-
famous archivo, the military information center that spied upon,
maintained illegal records on, and directed illegal actions against pri-
vate citizens .429 A successful dissolution of the EMP could result in
less interference by the military in the investigation and prosecution
of massacre cases.4 0 As part of a larger project of demilitarization,
the dismantling of the military intelligence apparatus could contrib-
ute to the strengthening of the rule of law in Guatemala.
When President Portillo's new civilian team took over the SAE of-
fices, however, much of the files, computer disks, and other records
were missing.41' The director of the SAE, Edgar Guttierez, filed a
complaint with the Ministerio PIblico,3 which opened an investiga-
tion that has yet to produce any results regarding the whereabouts of
the missing files.433 If recovered, those files could contain informa-
tion regarding the massacres themselves and the military's efforts to
425. See Alfonso Portillo asunid6 la Presidencia [,41lonso Portillo Assumes the
Presidency], PRENSA LIBRE, Jan. 15, 2000 (on file with the authors).
426. See REMHI REPORT, supra note 1, at 107-08 (containing a detailed de-
scription and analysis of role of EMP).
427. See Moreira Interview, supra note 305.
428. See id.
429. Id.
430. See M61gar Telephone Interview. supra note 111.
431. See Secretaria de Andlisis Estratigico Denuncia ..lnonalias Encontradas
[Secretariat of Strategic Analysis Denounces Found- .nonalies], PRENs_.\ LIBRE,
Jan. 25, 2000 (on file with the authors).
432. See id.
433. See Buscan archivos extraviados de varios casos [Lost Files From Alany
Cases are Sought], EL PERIODICO, Jan. 27. 2000 (on file with the authors).
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obstruct their investigations.4 The SAE's plan to establish a declas-
sification policy, discussed above, could then open those files and fa-
cilitate future requests by prosecutors for information regarding
411
military operations purportedly linked to the massacres cases.
Despite these positive developments, commentators suggest that
the massacre cases will never advance under President Portillo1 4 6 be-
cause the founder of his party, and current President of the Congress,
is the former military dictator General Efrain Rios Montt.4" Both the
CEH and REMHI reports agree that when General Rios Montt was in
power, more human rights abuses were committed than at any other
time in the course of Guatemala's thirty-six-year internal armed con-
flict.438 FAMDEGUA, which is acting as the private prosecutor in the
Dos Erres massacre, has accused General Montt of being the intel-
lectual author of that massacre.4 9 The former general has repeatedly
denied any knowledge of the massacres that occurred while he was
Chief of State, or has blamed the insurgency for the massacres. "0
President Portillo's initiatives in the area of human rights could
help to advance the massacre cases and spur judicial reform gener-
ally. The Portillo administration should be congratulated on these
first steps, but also reminded that they are only a beginning. If these
massacre cases move forward, that will be concrete advancement
without precedent for this government. However, until these and
other major human rights cases, such as the assassination of Bishop
Gerardi, are resolved, the promise of President Portillo's first steps
and good intentions will remain unfulfilled.
434. See Moreira Interview, supra note 305.
435. See id.
436. See generally Samay6a Interview, supra note 161; see also LaRue Inter-
view, supra note 16.
437. See Dieciocho ahos desde el Golpe de Rios Montt, [Eighteen Years Since
the Rios Montt Coup], EL PERIODICO, Mar. 23, 2000 (on file with the authors).
438. See generally Guatemala: Memory of Silence, supra note 9; see also
REMHI Report, supra note I (describing the nature of the atrocities committed
during the Guatemalan civil war).
439. See En Espaia Fueron Presentadas Otras Dos Querellas Contra Militares
[Two Demands Filed Against Military Personnel in Spain], PRENSA LIBRE, Jan. 29,
2000 (on file with the authors).
440. See supra note 437 and accompanying text.
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